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Abstract The transplantation of conventional
human cell and tissue grafts, such as heart valve
replacements and skin for severely burnt patients, has
saved many lives over the last decades. The late
eighties saw the emergence of tissue engineering with
the focus on the development of biological substitutes
that restore or improve tissue function. In the nineties,
at the height of the tissue engineering hype, industry
incited policymakers to create a European regulatory
environment, which would facilitate the emergence of
a strong single market for tissue engineered products
and their starting materials (human cells and tissues).
In this paper we analyze the elaboration process of this
new European Union (EU) human cell and tissue
product regulatory regime—i.e. the EU Cell and
Tissue Directives (EUCTDs) and the Advanced
Therapy Medicinal Product (ATMP) Regulation and
evaluate its impact on Member States’ health care
systems. We demonstrate that the successful lobbying
on key areas of regulatory and policy processes by
industry, in congruence with Europe’s risk aversion
and urge to promote growth and jobs, led to
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excessively business oriented legislation. Expensive
industry oriented requirements were introduced and
contentious social and ethical issues were excluded.
We found indications that this new EU safety and
health legislation will adversely impact Member
States’ health care systems; since 30 December 2012
(the end of the ATMP transitional period) there is a
clear threat to the sustainability of some lifesaving and
established ATMPs that were provided by public
health institutions and small and medium-sized enter-
prises under the frame of the EUCTDs. In the light of
the current economic crisis it is not clear how social
security systems will cope with the inflation of costs
associated with this new regulatory regime and how
priorities will be set with regard to reimbursement
decisions. We argue that the ATMP Regulation should
urgently be revised to focus on delivering affordable
therapies to all who are in need of them and this
without necessarily going to the market. The most
rapid and elegant way to achieve this would be for the
European Commission to publish an interpretative
document on ‘‘placing on the market of ATMPs,’’
which keeps tailor-made and niche ATMPs outside of
the scope of the medicinal product regulation.
Keywords Cell and tissue banking  Tissue
engineering  Advanced therapy medicinal
product  Regulation  European Union  Public
health
Introduction
For decades, the transplantation of human cells,
tissues, and cellular and tissue-based products (HCT/
Ps) like heart valve replacements for patients with
heart insufficiency and skin for severely burnt patients
has saved many lives, restoring essential functions
where no real alternatives of comparable effectiveness
exist. Recently, within the emerging field of regener-
ative medicine, tissue engineering became a much-
hyped component. Examples of applications for
human tissue engineered products (hTEPs) are treat-
ment possibilities for common conditions including
chronic wounds and bone diseases or injuries, or niche
applications such as severe burns. The most appealing
perspective for this sub-theme of HCT/Ps, however, is
to be able to regenerate whole organs (e.g. heart, liver,
kidney or trachea) and hence overcome the shortage of
donor organs for transplantation.
Cell and tissue directives
In 2004, the European Commission (EC), the main
originator of legislation in the European Union (EU)
political process, issued the EU Cell and Tissue
Directives (EUCTDs), which consist of three Direc-
tives: the parent Directive 2004/23/EC (European
Union 2004), which provides the framework legisla-
tion and two technical directives, 2006/17/EC and
2006/86/EC (European Union 2006a, b), which pro-
vide the detailed requirements of the parent Directive.
They were designed to assure harmonized and high
standards of quality and safety for the donation,
procurement, testing, processing, preservation, stor-
age and distribution of human cells and tissues for
human applications, to facilitate their cross-border
movements and to ensure availability in the EU.
Tissues and cells intended to be used for industrially
manufactured products and medical devices are cov-
ered by the EUCTDs only as far as donation,
procurement and testing are concerned. These Direc-
tives introduced requirements for human cell and
tissue establishments, which necessitated extensive
reorganizations and investments, but are today per-
ceived as overall positive.
Advanced therapy medicinal product (ATMP)
regulation
In 2005, the EC decided to classify all ‘‘innovative,
regenerative therapies which combine aspects of
medicine, cell biology, science and engineering for
the purpose of regenerating, repairing or replacing
damaged tissues or cells,’’ such as hTEPs, under the
heading ‘‘ATMP.’’ This implies that from that moment
hTEPs were considered as human medicinal products.
An ATMP ‘‘contains or consists of cells or tissues that
have either been subject to substantial manipulation or
that are not intended to be used for the same essential
function(s) in the recipient as in the donor and is
presented as having properties for treating or prevent-
ing disease in patients.’’ Expansion by culturing is
currently by default considered to be a substantial
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manipulation. Since 2008, these ATMPs are regulated
in Regulation 1394/2007/EC (European Union 2007),
which does not derogate from the EUCTDs, but
supplements them with additional requirements such
as production according to good manufacturing
practice (GMP) and compliance with marketing
authorization requirements and post-marketing phar-
macovigilance rules. The ATMP Regulation was
designed to allow free movement of ATMPs within
the EU market, better patient access to ATMPs, the
highest level of health protection for patients, EU
competitiveness in a key biotechnology area and
growth of an emerging industry.
Back to the future
In the summer of 2012, Belgian keratinocyte banks
received a letter from the Belgian national competent
authority (NCA) for medicines. In this letter the public
cell banks were notified that their ‘‘products,’’ human
keratinocytes for the treatment of burns and chronic
skin wounds, falls under the definition of an ATMP
and that the administration of this product to patients
as it is currently performed—i.e. exclusively under the
frame of the EUCTDs—is not allowed beyond 30
December 2012.
On the one hand, it was flattering to learn that
keratinocyte banks, since their foundation in the
eighties, had been delivering grafts, which today are
considered to be advanced products. On the other hand
it was confusing to learn that the cell banks would not
be allowed to continue the administration of grafts to
patients under the EUCTDs, especially since these
keratinocyte grafts had been applied on more than
1,000 severely burnt patients (De Corte et al. 2012)
and periodic inspections by the NCAs had not revealed
significant quality or safety issues.
Placing on the market?
Because the ATMP Regulation is a lex specialis inside
the medicinal product Directive 2001/83/EC (Euro-
pean Union 2001a), it addresses all ATMPs falling
within the global scope of Community legislation on
medicinal products, i.e. ‘‘medicinal products for
human use intended to be placed on the market in
Member States and either prepared industrially or
manufactured by a method involving an industrial
process.’’ Remarkably, there is no definition of
‘‘placed on the market’’ in the field of medicinal
products in the European Law. The field of medical
devices, however, provides a definition in Directive
93/42/EEC43 (European Union 1993) and in 2010 the
EC published an interpretative document on ‘‘placing
on the market of medical devices’’ (European Union
2010a; Klumb 2011). Accordingly, for EU manufac-
turers a product is considered placed on the market
when the product is transferred from the stage of
manufacture with the intention of distribution or use on
the Community market. This transfer can consist in a
physical hand-over and/or be based on a legal trans-
action. It can relate to the ownership, the possession or
any other right transferred from the manufacturer to a
distributor or to the end user. A transfer of a product is
considered to have taken place, e.g. when it is sold,
leased, given as a gift, rent out or hired. One would
think that non-anonymized cells and tissues for
autologous use remain the propriety of the donor and
are thus not transferred or placed on the market. But,
within the European Medicines Agency (EMA), the
Committee for Advanced Therapies (CAT), which
issues scientific recommendations determining
whether or not a referred product falls within the
definition of an ATMP, already considered several
autologous cell therapies to be ATMPs (EMA/CAT
2012a). In its argumentation to the NCA, the kerati-
nocyte bank of the Queen Astrid Military Hospital
argued that the application of their keratinocyte grafts
exclusively on their patients, at no charge for the
patient, would not qualify as ‘‘placing on the market’’
and that their ‘‘product’’ would thus not fall within the
global scope of Community legislation on medicinal
products. Conform to the hierarchy in EU Law, if the
medicinal product Directive is not applicable, nor is
the ATMP Regulation and as a consequence the
keratinocytes should not be classified as an ATMP.
This view was backed by a specialized law firm
(Bredin Prat 2012), but not by the authorities so far.
The commercialization of altruism
The troubling question is: ‘‘how did HCT/Ps originat-
ing from altruistic donations and delivered by not-for-
profit public cell and tissue banks become commercial
medicinal products?’’
In the EU—as is the case in the United Sates (US)
as well—it is illegal to buy and sell human cells and
tissues. The principle that it is not permissible for the
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human body or its parts to give rise to financial gain
was established in Article 21 of the 1997 Council of
Europe Convention of Human Rights and Biomedicine
(Council of Europe 1997). Nevertheless, in practice,
human cells and tissues are ‘‘sold’’ across borders
worldwide, as it is not illegal to compensate hospitals,
coroners and morgues for reasonable costs and charge
‘‘reasonable fees’’ for the processing rather than the
direct purchase of human cells and tissues. The HCT/P
transplantation field, which used to be dominated by
altruistic hospital-based tissue banks, is increasingly
occupied and steered by tissue brokers and (stock
exchange listed) corporate tissue establishments in
pursuit of profits, particularly in the US where the
market value of transplants from one body—not
including solid organs—was estimated at $230,000
in the year 2000 (Collins 2001). Expectations regard-
ing the potential markets that hTEPs (or ATMPs in
general) could cover are even higher. In the EU, a
significant part of tissue establishments are still
operating on a strictly not-for-profit basis, although
it must be said that some of them have been set up by
private industries, particularly for the supply of
starting materials for the production of hTEPs
(Table 1—1.4). International brokers supply human
organs, cells and tissues, obtained in low-income
countries without self-sufficiency, basically located in
Africa, Asia, Eastern Europe and South America, to
the powerful industry in human tissues (Council of
Europe 2009). But, the emerging global commercial-
ization of human cells and tissues is fraught with
dangers (Pirnay et al. 2012a). Ethical and safety issues
involving illegal and fraudulent activities (IFAs)
(Collins 2001) and legal excessive profit making
activities (LEPRAs; Pirnay et al. 2012a) soon emerged
and questioned the adequacy of the regulatory frame-
work that governed the HCT/P transplantation field.
Critics of markets in body parts state that these
practices violate a fundamental ethical norm that the
body should not be treated either as a property or as a
commodity (Council of Europe 1997). On the one
hand, there are clear indications that EU policymakers
wish to avoid the commercialization and commodifi-
cation of human body parts. On the other hand, the
recent EU HCT/P regulatory framework (EUCTDs
and ATMP Regulation) is business-oriented in its
origin: it allows for-profit tissue establishments in all
kinds and facilitates the development of a uniform and
global HCT/P market, but at the same time it is not
able to deal with the controversial market-driven
practices that raise deep ethical issues (Council of
Europe 2009). Today, the commercialization of
human cells and tissues is a fact, as are the malprac-
tices in the field, and the EU is maintaining a stand of
tolerance.
In this paper we attempt to explain how this
paradox came about. We demonstrate that industry’s
disproportionate influence on key areas of regulatory
and policy processes, in congruence with Europe’s
urge to promote growth and jobs, led to business
oriented HCT/P legislation. In addition, we found
indications that this specific example of EU safety and
health legislation will actually adversely affect Mem-
ber States’ health care systems.
Methods
We analyzed the rationale and elaboration process of
the recent EU HCT/P regulatory framework (EUCTDs
and ATMP Regulation). Particular attention was paid
to the following reports, which were provided by the
EC and industry in support of policy making:
• Opinion No 11 of the European Group on Ethics in
Science and New Technologies (EGE) to the EC on
the ethical aspects of human tissue banking (EGE
1998). In December 1997 the EC set up the EGE to
advise the Commission on ethical questions relat-
ing to sciences and new technologies. The EGE
consists of up to 15 members, who serve in a
personal capacity and are asked to advise the
Commission independently from any outside influ-
ence (European Union 2009). The EGE cooperates
with the Bureau of European Policy Advisors
(BEPA), the Forum of National Ethics Councils
(NEC Forum), the DGs concerned, representatives
of the Institutions of the European Union, experts
of the fields, parties representing different inter-
ests, including NGOs, patients and consumer
organizations and industrial stakeholders.
• Written reports of the Working Groups established
by the ‘‘Meeting on the Therapeutic Use of Human
Organs and Tissues’’ organized by the Portuguese
Presidency and the EC on 14–16 June 2000 in
Porto (Loty et al. 2000). The aim of this meeting
was to identify critical issues related to the
therapeutic use of organs, tissues and cells of
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Table 1 Textual extracts (statements, evaluations and perspectives) from reports of studies commissioned by the EC or industry
(listed according to publication date)
1. Opinion of the European Group on Ethics in Science and New Technologies to the European Commission: Ethical aspects of
human tissue banking (EGE 1998)
1.1. Wherever tissues are removed from human beings, and possibly transplanted into other human beings, the activities involved
in the collection and use of such tissues are subject to ethical requirements intended to safeguard respect for human beings, their
dignity and autonomy, and for the common good
1.2. All Member States of the EU adhere to the principle that donations of human tissues must be free, following the example of
blood, and this rules out any payment to the donor. However, the donor may receive compensation for the constraints associated
with tissue removal (e.g. travel expenses, loss of earnings, etc.). Some parties maintain that for the sake of fairness, when the
tissues become even indirectly a source of profit, donors should be paid. Furthermore, donor’s remuneration might increase the
supply of tissues. So far, however, the arguments in favour of the altruistic nature of tissue donation (like organ donation) have
prevailed. They are based on a regard for solidarity. Also they are inspired by the desire to avoid the human person being
regarded as an object (a source of organs and tissues). Another argument in favour of free donations is to avoid all risk of
exploitation of the most underprivileged who might be led, in doubtful conditions of health, to donate tissue exclusively or
primarily for financial reasons
1.3. The issue of the commercialization of human tissues, which have been processed and prepared for therapeutic purposes, is
even more controversial. For some, tissue banks must be operated only by non-profit-making bodies, as the tissues have
originally been obtained free of charge in a spirit of altruism. For others hold that the processing and conversion of tissues
involve costs, which they believe justify their commercial sale, in the same way as blood derivatives. The commercialization of
human tissues has the added advantage, according to its proponents, of encouraging industry to invest in areas, which will result
in greater availability of tissues on the market. This argument is most often advanced with regard to ‘engineered’ tissues
requiring sophisticated industrial processing techniques
1.4. Currently, although no surveys of tissue banks in Europe have been carried out, it seems that most of the banks are non-profit;
nevertheless some of them have been set up by private industries, particularly for the production of engineered tissues
1.5. In principle, tissue bank activities should be reserved to public health institutions or non-profit-making organizations. In such
case, this means that the delivery price of the tissues only covers the bank’s expenses relating to the tissues in question.
Nevertheless, given the current state of development of the sector, it is difficult to exclude tissue-banking activities by
commercial organizations, such as large private laboratories. This is particularly true where human tissues are used as a basis for
‘‘engineered’’ products requiring the use of sophisticated medical techniques. Tissue banks set up by industry should be subject
to the same licensing and monitoring requirements as non-commercial operators
2. Working Group’s written reports from the ‘‘Meeting on the Therapeutic Use of Human Organs and Tissues’’ held in Porto from
14 to 16 June 2000 (Loty et al. 2000)
2.1. The Amsterdam Treaty clarifies the horizontal nature of Community Health policy implying the obligation to ensure the
protection of Public Health in all EU policies. Specifically the paragraph 4 of Article 152 states that the Council must adopt ‘‘…
measures setting high standards of quality and safety of organs and substances of human origin…’’
2.2. Scope should consider the 2 documents:
Opinion of the European Group on Ethics in Science and New Technologies to the European Commission: Ethical Aspects of
Human Tissue Banking, 21 July 1998
Safety and quality assurance for Organs, Tissues and Cells, version 8, 26 April 2000 from the European Council
2.3. The survey of existing regulation in European Member States showed several oppositions on ethical aspects, many
similarities on safety aspects, but also a lack of regulation in many countries
2.4. Considering the increasing number of tissues and cells exchanged between countries, there is an unanimity of all experts to
express the urgent need for a regulation on tissues and cells. Support from all participants for European Directives on human
tissue. General principles need to be addressed in first instance in a directive. Annexes of this document should then provide
more detail and address certain issues (e.g. safety plus quality aspects)
2.5. Recognition of the need for a recognized system of unified regulatory controls, including specific regulations, and inspection
for these activities for each type of tissues or cells
2.6. Regulation of structures and activities could be at national or central European level (e.g. traditional tissues at national level,
innovative tissues by central European level)
2.7. Issues such as Vigilance and Traceability should be addressed more fully
2.8. The Organs Working Group agreed that legal initiatives should address the shortage of organs and tissues and that no new
legislation should be enacted that limits the availability of living and cadaveric donors
3. Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on setting standards of quality and safety for the
donation, procurement, testing, processing, storage, and distribution of human tissues and cells (European Union 2002a)
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3.1. The legal basis for this proposal is Article 152 of the Treaty, in particular (4)(a), which requires the European Parliament and
the Council to adopt measures that set high standards of quality and safety of substances of human origin
3.2. The measures set out in this proposed Directive incorporate requirements for the procurement, testing, processing, storage,
and distribution of tissues and cells of human origin intended for application in the human body. They do not prevent Member
States from maintaining or introducing more stringent protective measures, in conformity with the Treaty, and do not affect
national provisions on the donation or medical use of tissues and cells of human origin
3.3. In contrast to existing European Community procedures concerning the approximation of laws, regulations and administrative
provisions relating to proprietary medicinal products, this proposed Directive does not have as its primary objective the placing
on the market of tissues and cells of human origin
3.4. Autologous cells used for medicinal products require a completely different regulatory approach and therefore are completely
excluded from this Directive. Tissues and cells used as an autologous graft (tissues removed and transplanted back to the same
person), within the same surgical procedure and without being subjected to any banking process, are also excluded from this
proposal. The quality and safety considerations associated with this process are completely different
3.5. As a matter of principle, tissue and cell transplantation programs should be founded on the philosophy of voluntary and
unpaid donation, anonymity of both donor and recipient, benevolence of the donor and encouragement of the absence of profit
by establishments involved in tissue and cell transplantation services
3.6. The tissue and cell establishments directly concerned by the provision of this proposal vary from tissue banks, to health
centers where procurement is carried out, to third parties, which can be responsible for some step of the process. The proposal
will have indirect implications on the tissue engineering products industry. The requirements of this Directive may increase the
cost of starting materials used by business
3.7. No specific provision is envisaged for small and medium sized firms in this proposal
4. EuropaBio’s proposals on DG Sanco’s proposed Directive regarding quality and safety of tissues and cells presented during a
public hearing in the European Parliament on 29 January 2003 (EuropaBio 2002)
4.1. Industry to be accredited as Tissue Bank. Industry has the expertise in development of innovative products. Treaty 152:
Conflict occurs when a Member State does not grant accreditation as tissue bank to industry!
4.2. No need for industry to operate on 24-h basis
4.3. Contracted third party of a tissue bank should be allowed to distribute
4.4. Harmonize the scope of Directive for autologous and allogeneic cells used for industrially manufactured products for medical
use
4.5. Harmonized European regulations (considering Treaty 152) enabling small & medium-size companies investing in
development of cell & tissue engineered products
5. DG JRC-IPTS study report: Human Tissue Engineered Products—Today‘s Markets and Future Prospects (Bock et al. 2003)
5.1. More sophisticated and novel hTEPs (e.g. tissue-engineered intervertebral discs, larger bone substitutes, tissue-engineered
heart valves) might become available in the foreseeable future
5.2. Initiatives like LIFE (Living Implants from Engineering, USA) in 1999 promised to be able to tissue engineer a human heart
within 10 years. The time scale for a lab-grown heart has subsequently been extended to about 25 years by the founder of LIFE
(Zandonella 2003), which may still be significantly over-optimistic
5.3. The European market is characterized by young, small, research-based and technology-oriented companies, most of them
SMEs with less than 50 employees
5.4. In addition to companies, also tissue banks and hospital laboratories produce hTEPs. However, there are only limited data
available for Germany, the UK, and France on the scope and extent of their tissue engineering activities. It seems that currently
hospitals carry out research or produce fairly simple, autologous hTEPs for in-house treatments. Tissue banks consider tissue
engineering as a future strategic option, but do not yet produce any hTEPs. Activities presently seem to be limited to a few
institutions per country
5.5. Tissue-engineered products differ in many ways from medical devices and pharmaceuticals. For that reason they are not
appropriately covered by current European legislation. The EC is approaching this issue via new European legislation. A
directive on standards for quality and safety of human tissues and cells is already in the decision process of the European
institutions, a regulation covering human tissue-engineered products is currently being developed
5.6. Due to difficulties with reimbursement by European health insurance schemes of treatments based on tissue-engineered skin
products companies target increasingly the ‘self-payer’ patients segment, such as aesthetic surgery
5.7. Because of a lack of strong evidence for superiority of tissue engineering treatments the cost-effectiveness for burn treatment
favours the conventional treatment
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6. DG JRC-IPTS study report: Human Tissue Engineered products: Potential Socio-economic Impacts of a New European
Regulatory Framework for Authorisation, Supervision and Vigilance (Bock et al. 2005)
6.1. It seems that currently hospitals carry out research or produce fairly simple, autologous hTEPs for in-house treatments. Tissue
banks consider tissue engineering as a future strategic option, but do not yet produce any hTEPs
6.2. It can be expected that the current trend of concentration due to adaptation to national and European standards (e.g. Directive
2004/23/EC) will continue. Adapting to and compliance with the regulation could tie up resources that might otherwise be
available for investment in R&D. This is felt to be particularly likely in the case of SMEs. As well as delaying the launch of
hTEPs and limiting the range a given company develops and produces, this could tip the scales in favour of larger firms better
able to target pan-European markets. This could then lead to market consolidation in the form of takeovers or product licensing
6.3. Providers of equipment or GMP grade ancillary reagents could see increased sales in the short term as hTEP manufacturers
adapt
6.4. Downstream players such as doctors, patients and insurers might face higher product prices as companies seek to recoup their
increased compliance costs
6.5. Reimbursement policies are particularly significant. Currently, hTEPs are much more expensive than conventional treatment
options and cost-effectiveness data are scarce. Product prices may rise initially as a result of higher regulatory compliance costs,
but increased competition and economies of scale could eventually drive hTEP prices down
7. Eucomed Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on Advanced Therapies and amending
Regulation (EC) No 726/2004 (Eucomed 2004)
7.1 NOTE: The point under (a) would not ensure equal access for patients to high level safety, quality and effective hTEP
This Regulation shall not apply to:
a) Any advanced therapy medicinal product that is prepared by a qualified and licensed professional, such as a pharmacist,
physician, or trained and certified biologist, on an exceptional basis, in order to comply with a medical prescription for an
individual patient; the product must be prepared in full at the site of treatment of the patient, and without using standardised or
patented processes;
8. Eucomed position paper on the proposal for a Community Regulatory Framework on Advanced Therapies of 04 May 2005
(Eucomed 2005)
8.1. We would like to join the other Trade Federations in offering our help, with our experts, for the elaboration of the numerous
guidance documents, at all levels, requested by the Regulation. We believe that the experience gained by Eucomed members in
the Medical Devices field in providing loyal support to regulators in the elaboration of sound and balanced guidance is a wealth
to be fully exploited also in this area
8.2. We believe that it is paramount to ensure that the regulatory regime takes into account the speed of innovation in this sector,
the technology used (much more engineering oriented rather than pure pharmaceutical oriented) and the needs of the patients,
who cannot wait too long for access to the health products they need, in certain cases, to survive. This, of course, does not imply
that the level of controls should be less than rigorous, but it also has to be appropriate in order to achieve the end objective:
timely, effective, safe and quality patient care
8.3. It must also be noted that the times and fees for approval are extremely critical to encourage (or discourage) not only SMEs,
which represent the large majority of manufacturers of these products, but also big Corporations to invest in this promising
branch of medical technology
8.4. We do not have philosophical objections to the fact that the EMEA (European Medicines Agency) will deal with hTEPs, on
the contrary, we believe that a centralized approach may help in creating a favorable environment for the development of this
innovative technology
8.5. We believe that the European Union should be a level playing field for those researching, designing and manufacturing
hTEPs, but over all, we believe that patients should be entitled to have access to hTEPs based on the highest safety, quality and
efficacy standards. This cannot be reached if different rules apply depending on the nature of the business of the manufacturer.
For this reason, we oppose the creation of special rules for ‘‘one-off, non-industrially manufactured’’ hTEPs
9. Impact Assessment. Annex to the ‘Proposal for a Regulation on Advanced Therapy Medicinal Products’ (European Union
2005a)
9.1. At the Commission’s request the EGE has examined the potential ethical issues raised by the introduction of a common
framework for TEPs. These issues were analysed in the light of previous opinions of the Group as well as other reference
documents such as the European Charter of Fundamental Rights and the Convention for the protection of human rights and
dignity of the human being with regard to the application of biology and medicine: Convention on human rights and
biomedicine (‘‘Oviedo’’ Convention)
Cell Tissue Bank (2013) 14:525–560 531
123
Table 1 continued
9.2. While the other advanced therapy products have been regulated as medicinal products for many years within the Community,
tissue-engineered products currently lie outside of any EU legislative framework. This leads to divergent national approaches as
to their legal classification and authorisation, which impair the free movement of these products, hinder patients’ access to
innovative therapies, and ultimately affect the EU competitiveness in this key biotechnology area
9.3. A few hospitals and tissue banks have developed, or are planning to develop, large-scale tissue engineering manufacturing
facilities. They can, therefore, be regarded as competitors to tissue engineering companies. This is true in particular for
institutions, which intend to rely on industrial processes and to make their products available to patients and/or to other operators
on their home market or beyond national borders
9.4. In terms of future market developments, the outcome of potential competition between tissue engineering companies and
hospitals/tissue banks is open due to the often public, non-profit character of the latter. The fixed production costs are considered
to be similar for both types of actors. However, hospitals and tissue banks normally have less marketing costs and do not
calculate profit margins. On the other hand, tissue-engineering companies might be able to exploit economies of scale due to a
national or international orientation and have more incentives for a rationalised production process
9.5. Competition between tissue engineering companies and health institutions is expected to remain limited in the short to
medium term. Many hospitals do not intend to develop important facilities for producing a large number of TEPs. Their main
interest is in providing optimal treatments to their own patients, on a non-industrial scale. This will be done either through
cooperation with tissue engineering companies, or through the development of tailored tissue engineering treatments
9.6. ‘‘Placing on the market’’: some respondents considered the proposed definition of ‘‘placing on the market’’ as improper
because it does not cover products manufactured and used in the same facility (in-house use, for instance in hospitals). They
stressed that there is no reason why such products should not be subject to the same rules as tissue engineered products
manufactured by industrial operators. A large majority of stakeholders were of the opinion that hospitals, tissue banks and other
local actors should be subject to the same rules as enterprises
9.7. On the other hand, other stakeholders from the ‘Healthcare professionals’ and ‘Research’ category stressed that the exclusion
was too narrow, that the concept of ‘industrial manufacturing process’ may be too vague and that hospitals and university/
research environments should not be imposed unnecessary regulatory overburdens such as marketing authorisation requirements
9.8. Upstream players. Providers of cells and tissues will have to comply—if they haven’t already—with the provisions laid down
in Directive 2004/23/EC as far as donation, procurement and testing of cells and tissues are concerned. There will be no
additional requirements on the basis of the proposed Regulation
9.9. Detailed guidelines. As for gene and somatic cell therapy products, detailed technical guidance would be drawn up for tissue-
engineered products through guidelines, drawn up either by the EMEA or by the Commission. The fact that expertise is still
scarce in this fast-growing, fast-evolving area highlights the importance of extensive and thorough consultation with all
interested parties, in particular the industry, for the drafting of these guidelines
9.10. Directive 2004/23/EC provides for quality and safety standards for the donation, procurement, testing, processing,
preservation, storage and distribution of human tissues and cells. However, it does not address efficacy aspects, does not lay
down rules for the evaluation and marketing authorisation of tissue/cell-based manufactured products, and also does not cover
products based on animal cells
9.11. Public budgets will be affected by the proposed Regulation through the costs incurred by the mandatory manufacturing
authorisation and the post-authorisation surveillance for TEPs
9.12. Lastly, there may also be a potential indirect impact on public expenditure through pricing and reimbursement of advanced
therapy products. This ‘pricing and reimbursement’ aspect falls under the responsibility of Member States
9.13. Donor information: a few stakeholders requested that the donor be informed of the usage made of the tissue which they
provide as source material
10. Report of EuropaBio’s Industry Hearing, Tissue Engineering and Advanced Therapies (Geesink 2005)
10.1. Many stakeholders wondered about the meaning of the term engineered, arguing how this concept should be more precisely
defined, to prevent borderline issues with other cell based products. In response to these concerns the Commission drafted a
more precise definition of engineering, following the FDA approach in what are considered non-substantial manipulations for a
tissue engineered product. Nicolas Rossignol from DG Enterprise on an issue that was raised during the public consultation
10.2. A final point to consider concerns the explicit exclusion for certain products produced and used in hospitals. ‘‘We don’t want
to impose a too heavy regulatory burden or requirements on hospitals, but on the other hand of course we need to ensure a level
playing field for the different actors. And that’s a balance that I’m sure will be heavily discussed at the Council.’’ Nicolas
Rossignol
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10.3. The UK houses many small spin off companies and specialist research hospitals, and tissue engineering R&D takes place on
a very small and developmental scale. ‘‘It is very strongly iterative and characterised by the gradual emergence of efficacy. In
many ways what is happening is at the borderline between procedure and product. We also feel strongly that it is important to
recognise the gradation of risk that will vary widely according to the specific product.’’ The issue of hospital production is
another concern on the UK list. This is of particular importance to the UK, and obviously this bears on the issue of regulatory
impact of hospital production on a tiny scale, and potentially it will not be realistic to put together dossiers for such a tiny
number of products per year. Technical requirements have been questioned as well. ‘‘Clearly these need to be risk based, and
fully proportionate, to reflect the characteristics of the individual product.’’ Richard Woodfield from the UK Medicines and
Healthcare Product Regulatory Agency (MHRA)
10.4. There is overall support for the Commission’s proposals from the EMEA Committee for Medicinal Products for Human Use
(the CHMP). However, they still have concerns that centralised licensing may be difficult for hospital-produced products
10.5. ‘‘The point was made that the regulatory framework is a necessary, but not sufficient, step to make tissue engineered
treatments available to patients: Member States have to be prepared to pay to make them available to those in need.’’ Peter
Liese, Member of the European Parliament (MEP), Chairman of the European People’s Party (EPP) working group on
bioethics, member of the Committee on the Environment, Public Health and Safety and rapporteur for the EUCTDs
10.6. Liese stresses how this Regulation ‘‘has always been asked for by industry’’ but also that ‘‘we have to draft this legislation in
such a way that those companies that are covered by medical devices are happy with it.’’
10.7. Liese also stresses that the issue of hospital based services should be addressed, on which stakeholders hold very different positions.
‘‘There should be similar rules for the public sector, for hospitals, and for industry. But of course you have to draw the borderline.’’
10.8. The fact that the Sanco Directive (the EUCTD) is a Directive and the fact that the new Advanced Therapies Regulation is a
Regulation may cause a conflict in certain areas. For example this fact has led some Member States to implement rules that go
much further than the Sanco Directive. For example let’s assume the Advanced Therapies Regulation is there and a company
wants to market a product and so receives a marketing authorisation. However in certain countries the company can’t access
primary material, because they would have to be registered as a tissue bank, which is not required by the Sanco Directive
10.9. All healthcare products are aimed at the well being of patients, but not all healthcare products are made in the same way,
belong to the same industry or to the same technology. ‘‘And among other things, human tissue engineered products are not
medicinal products. They cannot be.’’ In other words the proposed regulatory framework, now mostly based on pharmaceutical
and medical device legislation, needs adaptation for tissue-engineered products. For example Directive 726/2004 needs to be
adapted with respect to the application of the GMP and the application of the Directive on clinical investigation. Dario
Pirovano, regulatory affairs director of EUCOMED
10.10. SMEs support the centralised procedure approach and welcome the provisions that have already been implemented such as
the product designation meetings at the EMEA, the reduction of fees, and the support for translation in all official languages,
which all really support SMEs. Nancy Veulemans, regulatory consultant for TiGenix, an SME trying to file a cartilage product
10.11. Furthermore Veulemans discusses the compatibility of the Regulation with the Sanco Directive. This Directive states that
access to primary material should be guaranteed and that manufacturers are allowed to settle themselves as tissue establishment.
‘‘We have already heard that this Directive is based on art 152 of the Treaty, and that Member States may add extra measures on
top of that. We have heard from cases where member States are already adding these provisions. And that would be one
question: if the Member States are and will always be allowed to add extra measures under article 152, and have this already in
place, how can this disappear again? So, the de facto situation of this development is that we have potentially 25 different
systems for access to primary material for manufacturers before the process can start. But, some countries are at this moment
denying companies to establish themselves as tissue establishment. Others require contracts, strong QA and audit in place with
each individual hospital and doctor, at the hospital’s premises, in order to be allowed to do a ‘procurement’. So this means that
access to primary material is not guaranteed and patients are denied or will be denied promising treatments.’’
10.12. Niese explains how the regulatory environment for this product in European countries ranged from unregulated to
transplant to medical devices to pharmaceutical legislation
‘‘For a big company, that always has to operate on a global scale, this means a no go.’’ But also some level of harmonisation for
reimbursement is needed, or at least agreement on the principles for evaluation and reimbursement. Detlef Niese, head of external
relations clinical development and medical affairs at Novartis the large pharma company that worked with US biotech company
Organogenesis on the development and marketing of Apligraf, the first tissue engineered skin product commercially available
10.13. The next question is for Rossignol again, and refers to the fact that more and more doctors use materials and equipment for
peri-operative processing of cells, and the question is whether this will be kept outside any regulation, especially given that these
processes are similar to those performed by industry, which is subject to regulation. Rossignol answers this is a question of
scope, and the balance between the level playing field on the one hand, which is needed by industry, versus tissue banks, and on
the other hand the regulatory burden or requirements put on stakeholders, and in particular hospitals. ‘‘And I’m afraid we will
have to wait for the Council discussion on this. At the end of the day this discussion is also mirroring the real political debate
behind this, which is the respected competence between Member States and the Community.’’
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human origin, which either would need urgent
follow up at Community level due to their
implications, or for which different opinions
among Member States pose difficulties for the
development of common standards. The reports
were drafted by groups of experts and were based
on questionnaire-guided interviews of some hun-
dred representatives from the public sector and
industry.
• Proposal for a Directive of the European Parlia-
ment and of the Council on setting standards of
quality and safety for the donation, procurement,
testing, processing, storage, and distribution of
human tissues and cells (European Union 2002a).
• EuropaBio’s (European Association for Bio-
industries) proposals on DG Sanco’s proposed
Directive regarding quality and safety of tissues
and cells presented during a public hearing in the
European Parliament on 29 January 2003. Euro-
paBio is said to represent more than 1,800 small
and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs; EuropaBio
2002).
• Two evaluation studies carried out by the Direc-
torate General Joint Research Centre’s Institute for
Prospective Technological Studies (DG JRC-
IPTS; Bock et al. 2003, 2005). DG JRC-IPTS
was mandated by the ‘‘European strategy and
action plan for life sciences and biotechnology,’’
which was developed to exploit the full potential of
biotechnology and to strengthen the sector’s
competitiveness while ensuring environmental
and consumer safety and consistency with com-
mon values and ethical principles (European
Union 2002b), to carry out biotechnology foresight
with the objective of identifying newly emerging
issues and possible proactive policy measures.
• Eucomed proposal for a Regulation of the Euro-
pean Parliament and of the Council on Advanced
Therapies and amending Regulation (EC) No
726/2004 (Eucomed 2004). Eucomed represents
the medical technology industry in Europe. Its
mission is to make modern, innovative and reliable
medical technology available to more people.
Eucomed members include both national and
pan-European trade and product associations as
well as medical technology manufacturers. The
industry they represent is said to employ more than
500,000 people.
• Eucomed position paper on the proposal for a
Community regulatory framework on advanced
therapies of 04 May 2005 (Eucomed 2005).
• ATMP Regulation impact assessment (IA) report
(European Union 2005a). The IA process is one of
the key tools put forward by the Commission to
promote ‘‘Better Regulation for Growth and Jobs
in the European Union’’ (European Union 2005b,
c). It aims to assess economic, environmental and
social impacts of EU policy. The IA report
Table 1 continued
10.14. Legislation at European level is needed, the Commission proposal is welcomed. We sincerely expect quick and positive
progress, as the patients deserve it, the patients need it, the patients are expecting it. Johan Vanhemelrijkck, EuropaBio’s
Secretary General
10.15. We heard from the SMEs, and inherent to what was said by the SMEs there were three words very important: cost, cost,
cost. So be very careful not to kill the SME or the product with demands that go over the capacity.’’ Johan Vanhemelrijkck
10.16. Conclusion. There is a clear need for tissue engineering to be regulated if companies are to be able to license new products
and for patients across Europe to receive the benefits of these. The needs of SMEs, which make up an important part of the bio-
medical sector clearly are being addressed, and hopefully will be dealt with fairly under the new legislation
11. Eucomed Advanced Therapy Medicinal Products Backgrounder (Eucomed 2008)
11.1. Patients should be assured that the treatments they receive are safe, are of high quality, and perform as intended, no matter
who prepares the treatment. The text needs to be amended to ensure that this is the case. Currently the proposal is worded in such
a way that hospitals might be able to avoid complying with the provisions of the regulation, whereas industrial manufacturers of
similar products would bear the obligations of compliance
11.2. There are already products available to patients on a national basis in certain member states, e.g. Germany. These have been
authorised for use by the national authorisation systems. Patients should be assured that the treatment they are currently
receiving will not be taken away from them during the process of implementing this new legislation. The current proposal
foresees a transition period of just 2 years for these existing products to comply with the new provisions. Companies are going
to want to comply with the new regulation because of the support and incentives it offers. Forcing them to do so in an unrealistic
timetable will not be good for patients
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provides a detailed overview of the policy options
envisaged by the EC with a view to establishing a
harmonized regulatory framework for tissue engi-
neered products, in the broader context of
advanced therapies. It outlines the background to
the proposal and presents an in-depth analysis of
all legislative options available and possible
impacts that may derive from them.
• Report of the stakeholder meeting organized by
EuropaBio in Brussels on 9 November 2005 to
discuss the proposed new Regulation on Advanced
Therapies, prior to it being published by DG
Enterprise (Geesink 2005). Some hundred partic-
ipants from all over Europe attended this industry
hearing, which followed a 2-day conference on
commercializing tissue engineering and regenera-
tive medicine. Major industrial players were
represented, in addition to professionals from
government, research and consultancy.
• Eucomed advanced therapy medicinal products
backgrounder (Eucomed 2008).
We matched the prospective evaluations and per-
spectives forwarded by the above-mentioned reports
against the retrospective and present states of the field,
with an emphasis on Belgium. Incidentally, a Belgian
company produces the first (and only) ATMP to have
obtained both centralized European marketing autho-
rization and national reimbursement (TiGenix 2011).
The participation of industry in the policy making
process (studies, consultations and IA) was also
analyzed.
Results and discussion
The making of the EU HCT/P legislation
A regulatory survey
During a meeting convened under the Portuguese
Presidency in Porto in June 2000, experts in the areas
of organs, tissues and cells analyzed the regulatory
situation in Europe (Table 1—2.1-8). A survey of
existing regulation in EU Member States revealed
several oppositions on ethical aspects, many similar-
ities on safety aspects, but also a lack of regulation in
many countries. The ‘‘Tissue Working Group’’
concluded that there is an urgent need for a single
EU regulation on the quality, safety, traceability and
vigilance of human cells and tissues (Loty et al. 2000).
They also provided specific orientations for the
development of such an initiative. A mother Directive
should address general principles, while detailed
annexes should address certain issues like quality
and safety aspects. They also recognized the need for
specific standards and inspections for each type of
tissues or cells. Regulation of structures and activities
could be performed at national or central European
level (e.g. traditional tissues at national level, innova-
tive tissues by central European level). The Organs
Working Group agreed that legal initiatives should
address the shortage of organs and tissues and that no
new legislation should be enacted that limits the
availability of living and cadaveric donors. Subse-
quently, experts and official representatives of the
Member States arrived at a similar conclusion (Eur-
Activ 2002). They supported the idea of developing an
EC Directive setting high standards of safety and
quality for the procurement, testing, processing,
storage, and distribution of human tissues and cells
in order to ensure a high level of human health
protection in the EU.
A two-tier approach
From the beginning it was admitted that a number of
new products that are based on a biotechnology
process would profit from a different and specific
regulation and legal basis. That’s why the HCT/P
legislation was divided into two parts. One part—a
Directive—would cover tissues and cells that are not
‘‘substantially manipulated’’ and are not part of a
biotech process, so mainly for ‘‘traditional’’ trans-
plants; the other part—a Regulation—would cover
products and therapies that are subject to biotech
processes that not only require specific regulation, but
that also need a complete harmonization of require-
ments to facilitate their access to the market. The level
of manipulation would thus determine if a graft is
classified as traditional transplant or commercial
product. It is thus not surprising that distinguishing
between minimally and substantially manipulated
proved to be contentious and problematic (Kent
2005). DG Enterprise decided to follow the FDA
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approach in what would be considered as substantial
manipulations for hTEPs (Table 1—10.1).
Article 152 of the Amsterdam Treaty
The EU is based on the rule of law. This means that
every EU action is founded on treaties, which have
been approved voluntarily and democratically by all
EU Member States. Article 152 (4)(a) of the Amster-
dam Treaty authorizes the EC to install a regulatory
framework for setting high standards of quality and
safety of organs and substances of human origin
(European Union 1997). This was as it were, the legal
basis for the Commission’s interference in the HCT/P
transplantation field (Table 1—2.1,3.1). In accor-
dance with the principles of subsidiarity and propor-
tionality, ECs actions in the public health sector
should be undertaken only if their objective cannot be
sufficiently achieved by the Member States and can
therefore, by reason of their scale and effects, be better
achieved by the EC. Community public health action
shall, however, fully respect the responsibilities of the
Member States for the organization and delivery of
health services and medical care.
The EUCTD proposal
In 2002 DG Sanco (consumer health) drafted a
Directive proposal (European Union 2002a) in line
with Article 152 of the Amsterdam Treaty (Table 1—
3.1) and taking into account the most recent progress
made and agreements attained at international level,
particularly within the World Health Organization
(WHO) and the Council of Europe. In addition, there
have been a number of consultations with competent
technical experts and representatives of the Member
States. According to the proposal, most of the
organizations interested in the field were consulted,
such as the European Association of Tissue Banks, the
European Association of Musculoskeletal Transplan-
tation, the European Eye Bank Association, the
European Group for Bone Marrow Transplantation,
the Donor Bone Marrow Association, Europdonor
Foundation and the International Alliance of Patients’
Organizations. For the industry, Eucomed medical
technology, the European Federation of Pharmaceu-
tical Industry Associations and Baxter BioScience, a
company offering GMP (Good Manufacturing Prac-
tice) biopharmaceutical manufacturing services, were
invited to Stakeholders meetings. The measures set out
in the proposed Directive incorporated requirements
for the procurement, testing, processing, storage, and
distribution of tissues and cells of human origin
intended for application in the human body. In contrast
to Regulations, Directives leave Member States with a
certain amount of leeway, e.g. to introduce more
stringent protective measures at national levels in
conformity with the Treaty (Table 1—3.2). The
Directive would apply to all constituents of the human
body used for transplantation, except autologous cells
used for medicinal products and cells and tissues used
as autografts within the same surgical procedure
(Table 1—3.4). The absence of profit by establish-
ments involved in tissue and cell transplantation
services was encouraged (Table 1—3.5). Because
the EUCTDs would be enacted through common
quality and safety standards and were thus merely seen
as ‘‘technical matters’’ they evaded public debate
(Hoeyer 2010). In addition, as it is only since 2005 that
the current formal IA process became mandatory of all
major EU policies, the IA of the Directive proposal
was non-exhaustive and limited to the evaluation of its
impact on business with special reference to SMEs.
The main conclusion of the IA was that the require-
ments of this Directive could increase the cost for
starting materials used by business and that no specific
provision was envisaged for SMEs (Table 1—3.6-7).
Processing of the proposal
On 26 June 2002 the proposal was transmitted to the
European Parliament (EP) and the Council. The
proposal was submitted to the ordinary legislative
procedure (ex ‘‘codecision’’), which brings together
Council, Parliament and Commission and has become
the standard way of decision-making. This means that
the directly elected EP has to approve EU legislation
together with the Council (the governments of the 27
EU countries). The Commission, in turn, drafts and
implements EU legislation. Debates during a 2003 EU
parliamentary hearing on the proposal focused mainly
on quality, safety and ethical concerns. Participants in
the debate included representatives from industry
(Eucomed and EuropaBio), scientists, commission
officials, non-governmental organizations (NGOs),
private blood banks and religious and bioethics orga-
nizations (Kent et al. 2006). EuropaBio put forth that
companies’ expertise in development of innovative
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products warrants them to be accredited as tissue banks
and that conflict (with the Treaty) would occur when
Member States would not grant accreditation as tissue
bank to industry (Table 1—4.1). Moreover, industry
tissue banks should be able to move away from the
traditional mode of tissue banking (Table 1—4.2-3).
EuropaBio also called for the harmonization of the
scope of the Directive for autologous and allogeneic
cells used for industrially manufactured products for
medical use (Table 1—4.4). The EP forwarded its
opinion to the EC on 10 April 2003 (European Union
2003a). Most of EP’s proposed amendments suggested
the strengthening of the Directive’s ethical provisions.
Although recognizing their legitimacy, the Commis-
sion was unable to accept their inclusion in the proposal
as ethical aspects fall outside the scope of Article 152
(European Union 2002c). On 30 May 2003 the
Commission transmitted an amended proposal that
took into account 35 of the 76 amendments. The
Council subsequently endorsed the general approach
taken in the amended proposal, adopting 15 of the 35
amendments (European Union 2003b). One of these
amendments widened the scope of the Directive to
autologous cells to be used for medicinal products.
Some phrases in the amendments were corrected (e.g.
‘‘encouragement of the absence of profit by establish-
ments involved into tissue and cell transplantation
services’’ was changed into ‘‘Member States are urged
to take steps to encourage a strong public and non-profit
sector involvement into the provision of tissue and cell
transplant services and the related research develop-
ment’’) to clarify that the goal is not to keep out the
private sector. Some of the amendments that were not
withheld addressed ethical issues such as voluntary and
unpaid procurement (1), non-profit procurement (5),
consent (3) or ethics in general (3) (European Union
2002c). One rejected amendment called for a code of
conduct to protect human dignity and a ban on making
the human body or its parts a source of financial gain,
while several others basically proposed compliance
with fundamental ethical principles next to compliance
with quality and safety standards. The common
position adopted on 22 July 2003 followed the same
direction on the EP’s amendments as that of the
Commission—accepting the majority of those related
to technical aspects and, given the perceived absence of
a legal basis, rejecting those dealing with ethics. On 31
March 2004 the EP and the Council adopted the parent
Directive 2004/23/EC of the EUCTDs (European
Union 2004). In conclusion, the principle of subsidi-
arity was adopted as a way of evading ethical issues
(e.g. with regard to the use of human tissue to make
profit) and enabling national interests to be accommo-
dated. At first sight, industry’s lobby for changes to the
Directive that would allow them to procure, store and
process tissue and to be accredited as a tissue
establishment was fairly successful. However, as we
shall see further in this paper, in some Members States
it is still impossible for industry to carry out fully
fledged tissue banking activities. As provided in the
initial two-tier plan, the EUCTDs would thus pave the
way for the high quality and safe application of human
tissues and cells in therapies which use the method of
tissue engineering (EurActiv 2004a).
The Lisbon Strategy and the open method
of coordination
In March 2000, at the European Council in Lisbon, the
EU set itself a new strategic goal for the next decade: to
become the most competitive and dynamic knowledge
based economy in the world capable of sustainable
economic growth with more and better jobs and greater
social cohesion (European Union 2000). Under this so-
called ‘‘Lisbon Strategy,’’ the Commission recalled the
economic, social and environmental potential of life
sciences and biotechnology—which was said to have
entered a stage of exponential growth—and, in con-
sequence, the strategic and long-term importance for
Europe of mastering these sciences and technologies
and their applications (European Union 2001b).
Europe could not afford to miss the opportunity that
these new sciences and technologies were to offer. In
2004, the Lisbon strategy was reviewed and it was
concluded that even if some progress was made, most
of the goals were not achieved (EurActiv 2004b). The
EC subsequently issued a proposal to refocus the
Lisbon Strategy on actions that promote growth and
jobs (Baroso 2005). To overcome the implementation
gap identified during the review, a relatively new and
intergovernmental means of governance was inaugu-
rated: the open method of coordination (OMC). It is a
decentralized approach through which agreed policies
are largely implemented by the Member States and
supervised by the Council of the EU. Formally, the EC
has primarily a monitoring role, but in practice it helps
to set the policy agenda and persuades reluctant
Member States to implement agreed policies (Flear
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2009). Today, OMC is the preferred method for EU
action in sensitive policy areas at the core of national
sovereignty, including health care. The objectives of
the OMC serve as guideline for national policy. They
valorize market rationality and begin the reframing
exercise by defining what is to be achieved (Flear
2009). Member States are then assessed, and placed in
a hierarchy of progress, through the use of the
objectives established in the OMC. In this, the
Commission uses its ability to muster expert views
and indicators and its position as a hub of the OMC
process. Finally, the EC persuades the ‘‘bad pupils’’ to
implement the agreed policies, even if they technically
belong to the competence of the Member States (e.g.
the OMC on health care).
Mind the (premeditated) gap
In the late nineties the emergence of human tissue-
engineered technologies was accompanied by debate
about the governance of this field. There was a widely,
though not unanimously, perceived need for a new
harmonized regulation (Faulkner et al. 2006). Industry
suggested that in the absence of such a pan European
regulation for cell- and tissue-based products EU
patients would be denied the potential benefits of this
regenerative medicine. Industry is generally in favor of
harmonized legislation as it creates predictability, helps
to make informed investment choices (Table 1—4.5)
and reduces the cost of having to meet different quality,
safety, efficacy and marketing requirements (Kent et al.
2006). Of course, for the EC to intervene, this regulatory
gap needed to be documented and confirmed by
independent experts. In 2003, a DG JRC-IPTS study
(Bock et al. 2003) confirmed that because hTEPs differ
in many ways from medical devices and pharmaceuti-
cals, they lay outside of any EU legislative framework
(Table 1—5.5). Indeed, they were explicitly excluded
from the scope of medical devices Directive (European
Union 1993), and the medicinal products Directive
(European Union 2001a), which regulates gene therapy
medicinal products (GTMPs) and somatic cell therapy
medicinal products (sCTMPs), but not hTEPs. In turn,
the EUCTDs did not lay down rules for the marketing of
HCT/Ps (Table 1—3.3) nor did they mention efficacy
criteria (Table 1—9.10). This is mainly because they
were based on Article 152 of the EC Treaty, which
aimed at establishing a high level of human health
protection while respecting the responsibilities of the
Member States for the organization and delivery of
health services and medical care, but did not pursue an
‘‘internal market’’ objective (EurActiv 2002). More-
over, from the start, the EC had decided that products
and therapies that are subject to biotech processes and
need a complete harmonization of requirements to
facilitate their access to the market would be covered by
a dedicated Regulation. The exclusion of hTEPs from
the EUCTDs—the regulatory gap—was premeditated.
Public consultations
DG Enterprise conducted two public consultation
rounds (in 2002 and 2004), which revealed a dis-
agreement about whether dedicated legislation is
needed for hTEPs or whether revisions to the existing
medicinal products or medical devices Directives
would be more appropriate (Kent et al. 2006).
Government/institutional officials favored using the
existing framework and EMA felt that the existing
framework for medicinal products should be used,
supplemented as necessary by the framework for
medical devices. In contrast, industry supported a new
legal framework. Industry highlighted the distinctive-
ness of hTEPs, their diversity and a view that existing
medicinal product regulation is too restrictive, costly
and that lengthy product approval times would limit
the ability of industry to bring these newer products to
the market (Kent et al. 2006). In the end, the consensus
was that public consultations had resulted in the
expression of a clear need for a specific Community
framework to cover hTEPs, taking into account a
tiered approach depending on the level of risk.
The hTEP regulation proposal
Following the public consultations, DG Enterprise (not
DG SANCO) prepared an hTEP Regulation proposal
(European Union 2005d) intended to bridge the regu-
latory gap identified by the DG JRC-IPTS studies (Bock
et al. 2003, 2005). The draft Regulation had as main
objectives to secure a high level of health protection, to
harmonize and facilitate internal market access and
finally to foster competitiveness. DG Enterprise was
required to address Article 95 of the Amsterdam Treaty
(EurActiv 2002) related to the free movement of
products across the EU. The proposal incorporated
requirements such as production according to GMP and
compliance with marketing authorization requirements
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and post-marketing pharmacovigilance rules. The bio-
tech industry, which had been calling for a Regulation
such as this for years, welcomed the proposal (Pincock
2005). One particularly positive note perceived by
industry was the Commission’s proposal to have the
regulatory process centralized through EMA. In addi-
tion, the Commission’s plan also involved strengthen-
ing requirements for risk management and traceability
of gene, cell and tissue-based therapies, and offered
special incentives for SMEs working in the field
(Pincock 2005).
The hTEP draft regulation IA
In 2005, a DG JRC-IPTS study (Bock et al. 2005) set
out to identify and assess the economic, social and
environmental impacts of several regulatory options
presented in the hTEP draft regulation, as an input to a
formal IA (European Union 2005a). According to the
IPTS study and IA reports, the lack of a tailor-made
and uniform EU legislation would lead to divergent
national Member State approaches as to the legal
classification and authorization of hTEPs, which
impaired the free movement of these products, deprive
patients’ access to innovative therapies using hTEPs,
acted as barriers to guaranteeing a high level of public
health protection across the EU and ultimately ham-
pered the development of a strong tissue engineering
sector in the EU and affected the EU competitiveness
in this key biotechnology area (Table 1—9.2). The
overall conclusion of the IA was that the proposed
regulation would be of significant benefit for all actors
in the field by providing legal clarity and certainty,
harmonizing quality and efficacy standards for the
placing on the Community market of hTEPs, improv-
ing the competitiveness of the concerned economic
operators and increasing the confidence of patients and
healthcare practitioners. The draft regulation was
released for an additional public consultation in May
2005. Meanwhile, the EC decided to expand the hTEP
regulatory text to also cover other ATMPs, like
GTMPs and sCTMPs.
Processing of the proposal
Because the Commission conceived the ATMP Reg-
ulation as a matter of science, technology, regulation
and the operation of the internal market, the proposal
appeared to be an ideal candidate for an ‘‘early
agreement’’ in the codecision procedure between the
EP and Council, which had become the standard fast
track—but less transparent—EU lawmaking proce-
dure (Judge and Earnshaw 2011). The dossier was
indeed concluded at first reading, but not without
generating significant political conflict and intense
controversy over ethics (as was the case for the
EUCTDs) during its passage through the EP. Ethical
issues that were extensively discussed and lobbied
included perceived breaches of the principles of the
non-commercialization of the human body, the integ-
rity of the person and the inviolability of human
dignity. In the end, ethical amendments were deemed
controversial and were dropped (Judge and Earnshaw
2011). On 30 October 2007 the Council formally
adopted the Regulation, which was signed by the EP
and Council presidents on 13 November 2007 (Euro-
pean Union 2007). On 30 December 2008, the ATMP
Regulation entered into force. Tissue engineered
products that were legally on the Community market
in accordance with national or Community legislation
on 30 December 2008 should comply with this
Regulation no later than 30 December 2012.
Industry’s influence on the regulation and policy
processes
For the elaboration of EU legislation policymakers
rely on key decision-making tools such as knowledge
and expertise, consultations of stakeholders and an IA
process.
Knowledge and expertise
Policymakers often rely on consultancy firms, which
are simultaneously working for commercial compa-
nies, for their supply of knowledge and expertise. Both
DG JRC-IPTS hTEP studies were carried out in
collaboration with the European Science and Tech-
nology Observatory and in particular with the Fraun-
hofer Institute for Systems and Innovation Research,
part of the Fraunhofer Society, the largest organization
for applied research in Europe. According to their
2011 annual report (Fraunhofer-Gesellschaft 2012),
over 70 % of their contract research revenue is derived
from contracts with industry and public sector
research projects. The remaining 30 % comes from
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the federal and La¨nder governments, among other
things to finance precompetitive research projects of
direct benefit to both industry and society.
Consultation of stakeholders
In preparing EU legislation, policymakers are
required to consult all potentially affected stakehold-
ers. But, most public institutions seem to have
underestimated the scope and thus also the impact
of EU legislation. In addition, they had limited
resources and were unaware or unable to fully
participate in the consultation processes. As a result,
companies are often overrepresented in these consul-
tations (Smith et al. 2010a). Consultations in view of
the ATMP regulation included workshops and round
table meetings, stakeholders’ interviews by DG JRC-
IPTS and public consultations. While 117 tissue
engineering companies from 14 countries (70 % of
companies having products on the markets), EMA,
and all NCAs were involved in the consultation
process, for hospitals and tissue banks only a limited
survey was carried out. Only 21 questionnaire-guided
interviews (30–60 min duration) were performed
with relevant experts and representatives from hospi-
tals and tissue banks in only 3 countries (Germany,
the UK and France; Bock et al. 2003, 2005).
Competent authorities for medicines were also con-
sulted. They are perceived to be independent, i.e. not
to represent any government, organization or sector
and therefor there is a tendency to particularly value
their advice. Yet, they are increasingly funded by the
pharmaceutical industry. EMA’s budget is financed
both from the EU’s annual budget, and to a greater
(and increasing) extent (80.1 % in 2011) from fees
paid by pharmaceutical companies (EMA 2012).
Recently, EMA was accused of acting to promote
the interest of the pharmaceutical industry. In 2011,
the EP officially declared: ‘‘it is unacceptable that the
Agency does not apply the relevant rules effectively,
resulting in the fact that there is no guarantee that the
evaluation of human medicines is performed by
independent experts’’ (European Union 2010b,
2011). The 2010 annual report of the Belgian NCA
for medicines shows that more than half of its income
comes from taxes collected on the basis of the number
of packages of medicines and raw materials sold or on
the turnover generated from medical devices (FAM-
HP 2011).
The IA process
The current IA process was designed to allow
policymakers to assess the likely effects of potential
options, in advance of their implementation, on the
basis of careful analysis of the potential economic,
social and environmental impacts of new legislation.
Health impacts are subsumed in social IA. The current
form of IA has been criticized for favoring economic
impacts over environmental or social (and particularly
health) impacts. Recently, it was demonstrated that
lobbying efforts by an alliance of corporate actors
have helped promote and embed a system of IA in the
EU that is business orientated, for example encourag-
ing policymakers to consult business (Smith et al.
2010b). This increases the likelihood that the EU
produces policies that advance the interests of major
corporations, including those that produce products
damaging health, rather than in the interest of its
citizens (Smith et al. 2010b). In current IA it is easier
to predict and prioritize positive economic and
business-related impacts over less tangible, long-term
negative impacts relating to health (Smith et al.
2010b). For example, the IA process uses monetized
values to predict impacts, which can be problematic
because there is no agreed way to value some of the
most fundamental health impacts, such as lives saved.
Industry’s lobby
The participation of industry in key decision-making
tools was thus overwhelming. But, the lobbying
exercised by industry is not illegal. Moreover, trade
federations often regard their participation as ‘‘offer-
ing help for the elaboration of guidance documents’’
(Table 1—8.1). For the EC ‘‘lobbying’’ means all
activities carried out with the objective of influencing
the policy formulation and decision making processes
of the European institutions. Concerns have however
been voiced by the media, academia and interest
representatives about lobbying practices which are
considered to go beyond legitimate representation of
interests. This applies amongst others to some
improper or misleading lobbying methods (European
Union 2006c). The examples that are often quoted in
this context are the provision of distorted information
to the EU institutions about the possible economic,
social or environmental impact of draft legislative
proposals (European Union 2006c).
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The new ‘‘EU-style’’ HCT/P transplantation field
With the new HCT/P regulatory regime (EUCTDs and
ATMP Regulation), the EC finally opened the door to
the commercialization of human cells and tissues. The
commercial sector was given a central role in a single
HCT/P market (Fig. 1). Hospitals, or ‘‘upstream play-
ers’’ as they are called in official EC documents, are
reduced to providers of starting materials (human cells
and tissues) to the industry. Patients are ‘‘downstream
players,’’ research subjects or consumers (eventually
self-paying, if there is no other way) of the products
provided by the industry (which are not necessary those
asked for by clinicians). Academia should research and
develop the innovative HCT/Ps commissioned by
industry and funded by EU agencies, which increasingly
prioritize health research in support of industry. The
ATMP IA report explains that hospitals and tissue banks
should collaborate with industry, or better, become
providers of human cells and tissues to the emerging
tissue engineering industry (Table 1—9.8). These
providers only have to comply with the provisions laid
down in the EUCTDs. Strangely, this means that the
production of the ‘‘raw materials’’ or ‘‘starting materi-
als’’ used to produce ATMPs does not need to be
compliant with established GMP. This scenario benefits
to tissue(-engineering) companies, which today are
confronted with a limited supply of starting materials
(donor cells and tissues). For example, according to
CNN Money, the product AllodermTM (a skin substitute
derived from human cadaveric skin, which earned
LifeCell the 16th place on FORTUNE’s 100 Fastest-
Growing Companies list in 2004) has only one hitch:
raw material (human donor skin) supply constraints
(Birger 2006). The not-for-profit image of public tissue
banks and laboratories does not negatively influence the
willingness to donate cells and tissues and makes them
the ideal suppliers for private companies, which are
generally distrusted by the public. Altruistic cell and
tissue institutions are at risk of being reduced to facades
behind which controversial commercial HCT/P activ-
ities can be hidden from the public.
Fig. 1 The HCT/P transplantation field as devised by the EU




The EC considered HCT/Ps to be tradable goods and
as such they were to be governed by the European
Treaties and Directives. Normally, health related
products are subject to the authority of the individual
Member States due to the subsidiarity for health care
matters (Article 152 (4)(c) of the Amsterdam Treaty)
(European Union 1997; Trommelmans et al. 2007a).
But, Article 152 (4)(a) of the Amsterdam Treaty
authorized the EC to install a regulatory framework for
setting high standards of quality and safety of organs
and substances of human origin (European Union
1997). As could be expected, various stakeholders
presented a wide variety of philosophical, social,
religious and economic viewpoints on relevant ethical
issues and in particular on the prohibition of commer-
cialization and commodification of human bodily
material, which lead to fierce ethical debates (partic-
ularly in the EP) throughout the elaboration process of
the regulatory framework. For some stakeholders
tissues originating from an altruistic (free) donation
should only be handled by non-profit-making cell and
tissue banks and laboratories, while others argued that
the processing of tissues (into hTEPs) involves costs,
which justify their commercialization, which provides
an incentive for industry to invest in tissue engineer-
ing. When consulted on the hTEP draft regulation, the
EGE reworked an earlier opinion (1998) in which it
acknowledged that the issue of commercialization of
human tissues, which have been processed and
prepared for therapeutic purposes, might be contro-
versial (Table 1—1.1-3), but concluded: ‘‘it is difficult
to exclude tissue banking activities by commercial
organizations, particularly where human tissues are
used as a basis for ‘engineered’ products requiring the
use of sophisticated medical techniques’’ (Table 1—
1.5). EGE’s opinions had no legal power as such, but
they strongly influenced the ongoing debates. Already
in 2000 they served as a reference during the meeting
on the therapeutic use of human organs and tissues
(Table 1—2.2) and they were part of the IA that
accompanied the ATMP draft Regulation (Table 1—
9.1).
We identified two main ethical principles that are
applicable to the current HCT/P transplantation field:
the basic principle of ‘‘respect for human dignity’’ and
the principle that ‘‘human bodily material should not
be considered as a commercial product or a commod-
ity,’’ the latter deriving its moral force from the
former. The key question is: will the processing
(engineering) of human cells and tissues lead to a
product that is no longer subject to these ethical
principles? Can processing alter the moral status of
human bodily material? One could consider HCT/Ps
to be ‘‘dual products,’’ consisting of human bodily
material and an added value in the form of a
technological process. Both parts clearly have a
different moral status, which leads to an ethical
dilemma; the human bodily material is not a tradable
good, while the added technological process (know-
how) clearly is. The problem is that one cannot be sold
without the other. A possible way out of this dilemma
would be to use the ‘‘doctrine of double effect
(Cavanaugh 2006):’’ if an action has foreseen harmful
effects practically inseparable from the good effect, it
is justifiable if the following are true:
• the nature of the act is itself good, or at least
morally neutral;
• the agent intends the good effect and not the bad
either as a means to the good or as an end itself;
• the good effect outweighs the bad effect in
circumstances sufficiently grave to justify causing
the bad effect and the agent exercises due diligence
to minimize the harm.
Translated to the HCT/P field, this could imply that
the commercialization of human bodily material
(foreseen harmful effect) could be justified when
tissue establishments act in good faith and produce
HCT/Ps for use in meaningful (e.g. life-saving)
therapies (good effect in grave circumstances). The
good faith of tissue establishments could be reflected
in a HCT/P cost price that only relates to the added
technological process, and this in a reasonable man-
ner. This avenue should be examined in greater depth,
but this is beyond the scope of this paper.
Ethical issues evaded
It was suggested that, from the start, ethical issues
must be considered as an integral part of the legislation
(Trommelmans et al. 2007b). But, according to the
official discourses, some ethical issues, such as the
eventual access of commercial companies to human
bodily material, were strongly affected by national
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culture, and therefore it was deemed too hard to
negotiate a proposal that dealt with ethical issues and
that would have been backed by a Council composed
of 27 National Health Ministers. According to the EC,
issues raised by biotechnology should be addressed at
the appropriate level in accordance with the subsid-
iarity principle (European Union 2001b). The EC has a
clear responsibility in some areas concerning trade and
internal market implications, while the responsibility
on setting the ethical principles lies with the Member
States (European Union 2001b). Technically, ethical
issues were deemed legitimate, but out of the scope of
Article 152 (4)(a): i.e. the quality and safety of organs
and substances of human origin. One could, however,
argue that ethical issues such as paid or unpaid
donation, the type and extent of donor consent and
whether or not to commercialize human bodily
material can definitely impact the quality and safety
of HCT/Ps. The principle of subsidiarity was thus
adopted as a way of evading ethical issues. This
‘‘cultural ethical relativism’’ (each culture should use
its own standards to judge all actions and institutions)
is not immediately obvious when it comes to the field
of healthcare, because one may assume that health is a
universal ethical good. In addition, similar ethical
issues in the organ transplantation field, where indus-
try plays a less pronounced role, are dealt with on a
global level (Steering Committee of the Istanbul
Summit 2008). There is a need for a global and
binding ethical framework for human cell and tissue
product transplantation that prohibits financial gain on
the human body and its parts (Pirnay et al. 2010). For a
start, the EU should adopt a clear ethical position
overcoming commercialization issues.
Responsibility towards the donor
The HCT/P transplantation field put forward by the EC
(Fig. 1) disregards the ethical issues related with the
supply of altruistically donated cell and tissues to
commercial companies. In certain cases, this transfer
might be in conflict with the public cell and tissue
banks’ mission statements and with their responsibil-
ity towards the donor or donor family to process the
cells and tissues in a manner consistent with the intent
of the donor, i.e. into products that fulfill medical
needs, crucial research or medical education. This is
all the more true in Member States that apply the
‘‘opting-out’’ system (presumed consent) for organ
and tissue donation. Public cell and tissue banks that
transfer donor material to private companies should
thus at least inform the donor family of the foreseeable
commercial exploitation and/or secondary use (e.g. in
cosmetic or vanity procedures) of the donated cells
and tissues (Office of Inspector General 2001).
According to the ATMP IA report, few stakeholders
requested that the donor be informed of the usage
made of the tissue, which they provide as source
material (Table 1—9.13). What if a donor (or his
family) voluntarily and knowingly donates bodily
material (for free or against payment) to a tissue broker
or establishment that will sell it as starting material for
the production of HCT/Ps? Although this seems to be
in line with the principle of autonomy, which recog-
nizes the right of individuals to self-determination, it
goes against the basic principles of ‘‘respect for human
dignity’’ and ‘‘non-commercialization of human
bodily material.’’ Indeed, it could be argued that
individual autonomy presupposes a so-called liberty-
right to decide freely on the use of one’s own human
material. In our view, however, this is not so:
autonomy is not just about an unlimited freedom to
decide and act as one feels like. Being an autonomous
person is also about being a morally responsible
person. In our case, such a morally responsible
individual would readily recognize that, informed by
the two basic principles, human cells and tissues
(one’s own or somebody else’s) should not be
degraded to tradable goods. In addition, interventions
that infringe on individual autonomy may be neces-
sary to secure public health (i.e. the health of the entire
population). For example, the decision of individuals
to donate skin to companies that transform human skin
into products for use in meaningless therapy or even in
vanity procedures (e.g. lip enhancements) could be
overruled on the basis that this practice could lead to a
(local) shortage of donor skin for use in life-saving
burn wound surgery and could thus impact public
health. More importantly, in people’s minds public
donation is all about life saving gifts, and donation
could stop straight away if the public felt abused.
The bottom line for all ethical guidance in the HCT/
P transplantation field should however remain the
commitment of regulatory agencies and of HCT/P
producers and researchers to fundamental values:
equitable access of patients to safe and efficacious
grafts, respect for the autonomy and the rights of cell
and tissue donors, and respect for the dignity of all
Cell Tissue Bank (2013) 14:525–560 543
123




In 2006, the HCT/P transplantation field—a formerly
non-industrial environment—was first confronted
with pharmaceutical industry requirements. The EU-
CTDs, and more specifically Technical Directive
2006/86/EC (European Union 2006b), introduced
GMP requirements, which were limited to the air
quality of the processing facility. A formal GMP
(cleanroom) facility was not required for the process-
ing of HCT/Ps. Since 30 December 2012, however, the
ATMP Regulation implies GMP compliance in a
general sense to a subgroup of HCT/Ps. Yet, GMP
knowledge is sparse in academia and hospitals; it has
traditionally resided in pharmacy (Hildebrandt and
Sethe 2012). Some academics pretend that GMP
originates from industry scandals due to excessive
profit-maximizing activities. The incentive to cut
corners to maximize profits, and thus negatively
impact public health, is expected to be higher in the
profit sector. Conversely, some industry representa-
tives argue that academia have a history of side
stepping quality and safety rules. The truth is that
compliance with certain quality and safety require-
ments is imperative to protect patients, industry and
academia alike from abuses (e.g. charlatans offering
unproven stem cell therapies on the internet; Hilde-
brandt 2012). The ATMP IA report (Geesink 2005)
stresses that guidelines on the application of GMP and
good clinical practice (GCP) for ATMPs should be
drafted in close consultation with all interested parties
and in particular with industry (Table 1—9.9) and
Eucomed subsequently underlined that medicinal
product GMPs are not directly applicable to hTEPs
and will need to be redesigned (Table 1—10.9).
The precautionary principle
The key question here is whether the recently imple-
mented (30 December 2012) higher level manufac-
turing requirements for ATMPs will really improve
their quality and safety? To begin with, we are not
aware of a thorough scientific evaluation of the quality
and safety aspects of HCT/Ps (including the ATMP
subclass) since their mandatory compliance with the
technical components of the EUCTDs on 1 September
2007. We are not aware of any report of safety issues
associated with ATMPs that up till now only needed to
be compliant with the EUCTDs. Yet, it is assumed that
supplementary manufacturing requirements are
imperative for public health. In earlier times, quality
and safety requirements used to be evidence based,
scientifically and clinically justified. It is odd that in an
age of ‘‘evidence based medicine,’’ regulators increas-
ingly rely on the precautionary principle—i.e. the
prevention of harm to human health by removing the
requirement for scientific proof of risk in advance of
legislative intervention, thus evading liability
(umbrella policy) and shifting the burden of proof to
the researchers and manufacturers. This results in
overzealous technical requirements, which are not bad
per se, if it weren’t for the disproportionate costs. In
2005, EuropaBio’s Secretary General rightfully said
that three words were very important today: cost, cost
and cost. He warned to be very careful not to kill the
SME or the product with demands that go over the
capacity (Table 1—10.15). There is a point at which
legislation can actually compromise patient care and
safety, by disabling valuable established therapies or
delaying the development of new technologies.
According to Kirkland (2010), we should try to
balance the risk avoidance principles with the broader
risks to the community that can result from overzeal-
ous or inappropriate application of regulatory stan-
dards. To quote Alastair Kent, Director of Genetic
Alliance UK: ‘‘perfect is the enemy of the good’’ and
‘‘if we eliminate risk, there will be no progress.’’ A
considerable risk is sometimes worth taking. For
example, a parachute that only opens in 90 % of cases
is not acceptable in normal circumstances. But, what if
the pilot died and the airplane is 100 % sure to crash?
Patients should be more involved in the decision
making process as Regulations must follow the
biology of patients (Kent 2012). According to Richard
Woodfield from the United Kingdom (UK) Medicines
and Healthcare Product Regulatory Agency (MHRA),
technical requirements need to be risk based and fully
proportionate, to reflect the characteristics of the
individual product (Table 1—10.3). For some HCT/
Ps, risk-based approaches for bioburden control in
non-sterile products could be acceptable (Migliaccio
2012). Donor skin (products) for use in burn wound
patients, for example, do not need to be sterile and do
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not need to be processed in a clean room facility
(Pirnay et al. 2012b). Recently, DG Sanco forwarded a
revised version of Annex 2 of the GMP Guide to
accommodate for several new product types, including
ATMPs (European Union 2012). Interestingly, in
some cases marketing authorization or clinical trial
authorization provides for an allowable type and level
of bioburden instead of sterility.
Enforcement
Higher level technical requirements such as GMP
compliance do not guarantee—nor are they a pre-
requisite for—quality, safety and efficacy of a product.
Of course, Directives and Regulations are in them-
selves insufficient to prevent patients from unsafe
medical products or devices. The PIP breast implant
scandal (Donawa and Gray 2012) is a recent illustra-
tion of this. A French company decided to downright
ignore the applicable quality and safety standards by
making breast implants from cheaper industrial-grade
silicone normally used for electronics, mattresses or
the agriculture industry (Chrisafis 2011). Yet, the
company was in possession of a certificate of confor-
mity with European standards (including compliance
with GMP for medical devices) and hundreds of
thousands of implants were sold and implanted on
three continents. There is still a lack of inspection and
effectiveness measures. We feel that common sense
and enforcement of the EUCTD requirements through
adequate inspections are more important for patient
safety than imposing GMP compliance to the HCT/P
transplantation field. Within the European Standards
and Training in the Inspection of Tissue Establish-
ments (EUSTITE) project, inspector-training courses
were started in 2008. A unitized valuation during the
inspections will be an important step to get the aim of
similar quality and safety of human tissues and cells
that are applied to patients for therapeutic purposes in
the Member States (European Union 2010c).
Private versus public tissue establishments
Competition
Since the introduction of the Lisbon Strategy, compe-
tition between health care providers is seen as a means
to reduce costs and increase quality. According to the
second DG JRC-IPTS study report, the current trend of
concentration of tissue establishments and HCT/Ps
due to adaptation to national and European standards
(i.e. the EUCTDs) would continue. In the short term,
manufacturers’ need to adapt to these more stringent
quality and safety standards and requirements for
marketing authorization would tie up resources. As
well as forcing companies to concentrate on fewer
products, this could tip the scales in favor of larger
firms better able to target pan-European markets
(Table 1—6.2). This prediction was repeated in the
ATMP IA report. Of course, this scenario might also
apply to hospitals and tissue banks active in tissue
engineering. Moreover, according to the IPTS study
and IA reports, hospitals and tissue banks could be
regarded as competitors to tissue engineering compa-
nies, even if they only made their products available to
patients in their country and occasionally beyond
national borders (Table 1—9.3). According to the IA
report, this potential competition would be open due to
the often public, non-profit character of hospital tissue
banks. Hospitals and tissue banks would have less
marketing costs and would not bring in profit margins,
whereas tissue-engineering companies could exploit
economies of scale (Table 1—9.4). Further on, the IA
minimalizes the impact of this competition by stating
that it is expected to remain limited in the short to
medium term (Table 1—9.5). In an animated discus-
sion during the European Association of Tissue Banks
Congress’ ATMP/HE Workshop (Vienna, 22 Novem-
ber 2012) EU policy makers and competent authorities
asked the public cell and tissue banking community to
empathize with tissue companies, which are asked to
comply with expensive and stringent regulation while
hospitals can use the HE loophole to produce cheaper
‘‘generic’’ versions of their products. But, isn’t this
putting the cart before the horse? One could as easily
argue that ATMPs were and still are mainly produced
by public cell and tissue banks, which are now
confronted with pharmaceutical requirements asked
for by industry in order to appropriate the human cell
and tissue transplantation field for themselves.
A level playing field
Initially, the ATMP Regulation proposal stated that
the Regulation should not apply to any ATMP that is
prepared by a qualified and licensed professional, such
as a pharmacist, physician, or trained and certified
biologist, on an exceptional basis, in order to comply
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with a medical prescription for an individual patient;
the product must be prepared in full at the site of
treatment of the patient, and without using standard-
ised or patented processes. Eucomed lobbied to
remove this exemption (Table 1—7.1). Industry
insisted on a level HCT/P playing field, out of concern
for public health (Table 1—7.1, 8.5, 10.2, 11.1). The
ATMP IA report reveals that industry stakeholders
considered the initially proposed definition of ‘‘plac-
ing on the market’’ as improper because it did not
cover products manufactured and used in the same
facility (in-house use, for instance in hospitals;
Table 1—9.6). A large majority of stakeholders,
including the European Parliament’s rapporteur for
the EUCTDs (Table 1—10.7), were of the opinion that
hospitals, tissue banks and other local actors should be
subject to similar rules as enterprises. This is not
surprising, considering that most consulted experts
were indeed representing, or had affinity with industry.
Stakeholders from the ‘‘healthcare professionals’’ and
‘‘research’’ category in turn argued that the exclusion
was too narrow, that the concept of ‘‘industrial
manufacturing process’’ may be too vague and that
hospitals and university/research environments should
not be imposed unnecessary regulatory overburdens
such as marketing authorization requirements
(Table 1—9.7). In the end, it was decided that all
ATMPs, including those manufactured and used on
single patients in a hospital, would fall within the
scope of the ATMP Regulation.
The current state of the HCT/P transplantation field
Gold plating
The term ‘‘gold plating’’ refers to the practice of
national bodies exceeding the terms of EC directives
when implementing them into national law. This is
what happened with the EUCTDs. The official aim of
these Directives was to set out harmonized quality and
safety standards for dealing with human tissues and
cells. The underlying aim was to provide access to safe
cells and tissues for the emerging HCT/P industry—
‘‘access to primary material should be guaranteed and
that manufacturers are allowed to settle themselves as
tissue establishment’’ (Table 1—4.1). As expected,
some Member States—mainly for ethical reasons—
did not want to give that kind of direct access to
industry. The principle of subsidiarity allowed them to
add extra measures on top of the EUCTD requirements
to prevent industry’s direct access to human cells and
tissues (Table 1—3.2; Kent 2005). In Belgium, for
example, only tissue banks exploited by a hospital can
obtain direct access to human cells and tissues for
allogeneic use. So, the de facto situation of this
development is that companies targeting the EU
market are confronted with potentially different sys-
tems for access to primary material (Table 1—10.11).
This means that industry’s access to primary material
(the underlying goal of the EUCTDs) is not guaranteed
(Table 1—10.8, 11). According to the industry, this
situation will lead to patients being denied promising
treatments.
The actual players
According to the 2003 DG JRC-IPTS study report,
there were only limited data available on the scope and
extent of the tissue engineering activities of public
tissue banks and laboratories (Table 1—5.4). Instead
of actually producing the missing data, the research
center chose to assume that hospitals carried out
research or produced fairly simple, autologous hTEPs
for in-house treatments and considered tissue engi-
neering as a future strategic option, but did not yet
produce any hTEPs (Table 1—5.4, 6.1). The com-
mercial tissue-engineering sector in Europe was said
to be characterized by small research-based technol-
ogy-intensive biotechnology companies (Table 1—
5.3). According to Eucomed, SMEs did indeed
represent the large majority of manufacturers of
hTEPs, but also big corporations would invest in this
promising branch of medical technology (Table 1—
8.3). Today, however, it is clear that with regard to
ATMPs, the pharmaceutical industry has only limited
interest in playing its ‘‘usual’’ role of financing
development and acting as a sponsor in clinical trials
(Hildebrandt and Sethe 2012). Several reasons for this
were suggested, including intellectual property and
reimbursement issues and the fact that ATMPs are
more closely related to transplantation, an area that
does not interface much with established industrial
R&D (Hildebrandt and Sethe 2012). In contrast, the
pharmaceutical industry is very much interested in
obtaining valuable research cells and tissues (Barnes
2006). For example, human instead of animal tissue
can be used in earlier stages of new drug testing to
more accurately predict the safety of new treatments.
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Traditionally it has been hard for drug firms to get hold
of human tissue due to ethical issues and the
challenges of patient and family consent. As a result,
human tissue is said to be worth more than diamonds,
being valued at $500/g (Barnes 2006).
Today, it is clear that the actual developers of
ATMPs are different from those of conventional
medicinal products, with a very high proportion of
ATMPs developed by academia/hospitals and SMEs
and an almost complete absence of ‘‘big pharma’’ (No
authors listed 2011). In contrast to the assumptions
presented in the IPTS studies, public actors did
certainly provide the majority of grafts that today
have become ATMPs (Hildebrandt and Sethe 2012).
In Belgium, as in most Member States, accredited cell
and tissue banks adhered to national human cell and
tissue legislations and quality standards long before
the introduction of the EUCTDs. These national
regulatory frameworks enabled the provision of
acceptable amounts of affordable, safe and ethically
sound transplants, including numerous grafts that
today are considered to be ATMPs. On its website,
the Belgian NCA for medicines maintains a list with
approved Belgian establishments of human bodily
material. According to this list (October 2012 update;
FAMHP 2012a), 13 establishments were approved for
‘‘advanced therapy’’ (with reference to the ATMP
regulation 1394/2007/EC) under the EUCTDs
(Table 2). The majority (n = 10) of them are hospital
tissue banks or laboratories, while only three are
private companies. These 10 public establishments
provided 22 grafts approved for use in advanced
Table 2 Belgian
establishments of human
body material accredited (as
published in Ministerial
Decrees) for ‘‘advanced






a ChondroCelect, the first
EC authorized ATMP on
the EU market




Lie`ge University Hospital Dendritic cells 4 December 2007
Mesenchymal stem cells 4 December 2007
Pre-osteoblastic cells 30 December 2008
South Luxemburg Hospital Proliferative tissue 11 July 2011
Saint-Luc University Hospital Hepatocytes 13 February 2006
Hepatic stem cells 2 June 2008
Islets of Langerhans 30 December 2008
Adipose stem cells 25 August 2009
Institute Jules Bordet Dendritic cells 30 December 2008
Mesenchymal cells 30 December 2008
Lymphocytes 1 December 2009
Antwerp University Hospital Dendritic cells 30 December 2008
Mesenchymal cells 30 December 2008
Epithelial cells 30 December 2008
Brussels University Hospital Beta cells 18 December 1997
Vrije Universiteit Brussel Dendritic cells 30 December 2008
Ghent University Hospital Dendritic cells 21 September 2010
Keratinocytes 18 December 1997
Leuven University Hospital Mesenchymal stem cells 1 September 2011
Dendritic cells 5 August 2010
Keratinocytes 17 February 2000
Queen Astrid Military Hospital Keratinocytes 18 December 1997
Private
Bone Therapeutics Bone marrow stem cells 30 June 2010
Cardio 3 BioSciences Cardiac progenitor cells 1 April 2011
TiGenix Autologous chondrocytesa 1 December 2009
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therapies (Table 2). Already in the nineties, years
before both IPTS studies, 3 Belgian public tissue
establishments were accredited by the Belgian NCA
(upon inspection) to produce and distribute ‘‘hidden’’
ATMPs for clinical use (Table 2). We had to wait until
2009 for the first private company to get an ATMP on
the market. Recently, the Belgian NCA summoned the
accredited Belgian establishments of human bodily
material to submit a letter of intent to declare and
specify activities that could qualify as ATMP. A few
days before the submission deadline (31 March 2012),
21 potential ATMP activities were declared (Mush
2012). A recent survey revealed that in Europe, 80 %
of ATMPs are under development in academia
(Hildebrandt 2012). Actually, SMEs and particularly
public cell and tissue banks are essential for ATMP
development and production because they are the only
operators that will target grafts on niche markets (e.g.
severe burns), which are not or less attractive for large
players. Yet, their central role as drivers for the
development and manufacture of ATMPs has been
overlooked (Hildebrandt and Sethe 2012).
Outcome of the ATMP regulation
In 1999, initiatives like LIFE (Living Implants from
Engineering, USA) promised to be able to tissue
engineer human organs (e.g. hearts) within 10 years
(Zandonella 2003). In 2000, the Scientific Committee
on Medicinal Products and Medical Devices warned
that the absence of a specific regulatory mechanism
would hamper the imminence of commercialization of
hTEPs (European Union 2001c). According to the
2003 DG JRC-IPTS study (Bock et al. 2003), sophis-
ticated and novel hTEPs (e.g. tissue-engineered inter-
vertebral discs, larger bone substitutes and heart
valves) would become available in the foreseeable
future (Table 1—5.1). Today, more than a decade
later, it seems that at least some of these expectations
were glossed over. In a 2003 Nature paper, LIFEs
chief visionary conceded that LIFEs 10-year timescale
was unrealistic (Table 1—5.2; Zandonella 2003).
‘‘We were trying to capture the attention of the
public,’’ he admitted. Four years after its implemen-
tation, the net outcome of the ATMP Regulation is
very disappointing. Seventy requests for ATMP-
classification submitted to EMA’s CAT resulted in
eight marketing authorization applications (EMA/
CAT 2012b) from which only one was granted ATMP
market authorization by the Commission: ChondroC-
elect, characterized autologous chondrocytes (EMA
2009). On 20 July 2012, on its fourth attempt, a second
ATMP—Glybera, a gene therapy product for the
treatment of lipoprotein lipase deficiency, obtained a
positive opinion that recommends marketing authori-
zation (EMA/CAT 2012b). The creation of a hTEP
hype without subsequent delivery did, however, create
a playing field for charlatans offering unsafe therapies,
such as unproven stem cell therapies practiced outside
the standard clinical trial network, threatening the
cause of legitimate clinical investigation (Daley
2012).
The hospital exemption (HE) rule
It seems mind-blowing that public hospitals and
laboratories will be encouraged—to put it mildly—
to squeeze their established ‘‘advanced’’ therapies
through the ATMP funnel where numerous companies
have failed. This view was shared by EMA (Table 1—
10.4) and by the EC, which introduced the HE rule
(Article 28 of the ATMP Regulation) to allow
hospitals to provide non-routine ATMPs for an
individual patient in the transitional period or in case
of high-unmet medical need because there is no
authorized ATMP alternative available. The exemp-
tion applies to any ATMP, prepared on a non-routine
basis according to specific quality standards, and used
within the same Member State in a hospital under the
professional responsibility of a medical practitioner, in
order to comply with an individual medical prescrip-
tion for a custom-made product for an individual
patient. Products that meet the ATMP definition, but
fall under the scope of the HE are exempted from the
obligation to be authorized via the centralized proce-
dure. Member States are requested to lay down rules
for authorizing these products by the NCA whilst at
the same time ensuring that relevant Community rules
related to quality and safety are not undermined.
Traceability, quality and pharmacovigilance standards
for ATMPs under the HE should be equivalent to
requirements for a centralized marketing authoriza-
tion. Not surprisingly, this rather subjective descrip-
tion gave rise to serious discussions between and
within national cell and tissue banking communities
and NCAs. In The Netherlands, a HE will only be
granted for maximum 10 applications per year. In the
UK, the MHRA considers that it is not feasible to
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provide a simple numerical formula that would
delineate the boundary between routine and non-
routine production. The UK ‘‘specials’’ scheme, set up
under the derogation permitted in Article 5 (1) of the
medicinal products Directive 2001/83/EC (European
Union 2001a), permits doctors and certain other
prescribers to commission an unlicensed relevant
medicinal product to meet the special needs of
individual patients. In principle this scheme is avail-
able for ATMPs as for any other category of medicinal
product. There is a ‘‘special needs test,’’ interpreted to
mean the absence of a pharmaceutically equivalent
and available licensed product. In other words,
unlicensed ATMPs could be authorized when no
equivalent licensed products are available (Lowdell
2012). The Belgian legislation for applying HE is still
under development (Mush 2012). Dossier require-
ments for HE, including information on production
process and environment and safety and efficacy data,
are being developed. It is however clear that in the end
in Belgium—as is already the case in several other
Member States—GMP principles, which imply major
investment in upgrading manufacturing facilities, will
generally apply and that only very slight deviations
will be tolerated and this on a case-by-case basis. It is
also clear that different interpretation of the HE by
NCAs does not go in the sense of European harmo-
nization. In addition, van Wilder argues that there is
evidence that the HE rule is a threat to the aim of the
ATMP Regulation of guaranteeing the highest level of
health protection for patients (Van Wilder 2012). We
tend to agree, as it is very hard to obtain the experience
and training necessary to guarantee the best quality of
work when production is only sporadic (e.g. less than
10 applications per year). Finally, it is rather strange
that an exemption rule will actually need to accom-
modate for the majority of ATMPs.
Public cell and tissue banks are up against the wall
The last decade, the HCT/P transplantation field made
considerable efforts to conform to the national
transpositions of the EUCTDs. Some public cell and
tissue banks were not able to comply and threw in the
towel. Others, which indeed had a rather nonchalant
attitude towards quality and safety, were no longer
licensed by the NCAs. In Belgium, for example, the
number of authorized bone banks was reduced by a
third (FAMHP 2012b). Some survivors of this
partition are now confronted with the ATMP Regu-
lation, which imposes without distinction and without
strong scientific support (e.g. quality and safety under
the EUCTDs was not evaluated) another layer of
expensive pharmaceutical industry standards (e.g.
GMP compliance and marketing authorization), even
when their products will never reach the EU market.
These requirements were designed for and in collab-
oration with pharmaceutical companies, which typi-
cally produce large batches of drugs for application in
many patients. Where EU centralized marketing
authorization may provide an incentive for compa-
nies, hospitals or academic centers do certainly not
aim at holding such an authorization. Pharmaceutical
industry standards are not compatible with niche
applications where economies of scale don’t apply, or
with ‘‘a` la carte’’ and often single patient procedures
with limited time lines (Apperley 2012). This applies
to both SMEs and public tissue establishments. GMP
facilities, for example are only profitable when
producing large batches of products. Most hospital
cell and tissue banks have a vested interest in
providing meaningful, reasonably priced, often tai-
lor-made treatments to (niche) patients, and this on a
non-industrial scale. In addition, in some Member
States like Belgium, these banks are not allowed to
make profits. They can thus focus on doing the things
that yield better health outcomes without having to
maximize profits in the process. But, as mentioned
before, the competition of established public actors,
which provided ‘‘hidden’’ ATMPs at minimum
price—i.e. without (overzealous) pharmaceutical
industry requirements and without margin of profit,
was perceived as unjust and troublesome by the
emerging tissue engineering industry. As predicted in
the ATMP IA report, the trend of concentration is
likely to continue (Table 1—6.2) as many hospitals
and tissue banks may abandon their ATMP efforts in
the near future. To safeguard some life-saving ther-
apies, and because medicine won’t stop on its way, the
field might evolve to circumvent legislation and find
refuge under the umbrella of the ‘‘Declaration of
Helsinki’’ or the ‘‘single surgical procedure’’ rule (e.g.
peri-operative processing of cells; Table 1—10.13).
The single surgical procedure is indeed an easier
alternative to pursue medical advances, but it lacks
some of the quality and safety aspects and the
oversight of HCT/Ps produced and delivered by cell
and tissue banks.
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The impact of the EU HCT/P legislation
on Member States’ health care systems
Indirect impact
The costs of ATMPs are much higher compared to
established conventional treatments, as developers
need to compensate their investments. Reimbursement
of these costs by the government is a contentious issue,
yet it is crucial for the survival of ATMP producers
and for making ATMPs available to those in need
(Table 1—10.5). Access to hTEPs depends on more
than just product availability. Treatments must be
affordable for patients and healthcare systems for
them to be applied in the long run. The second DG
JRC-IPTS study report (Bock et al. 2005) states
‘‘reimbursement policies are particularly significant’’
and ‘‘currently, hTEPs are much more expensive than
conventional treatment options and cost-effectiveness
data are scarce’’ (Table 1—6.5). The report also states
‘‘downstream players such as doctors, patients and
insurers might face higher product prices as compa-
nies seek to their increased compliance (to national
and EU standards) costs’’ (Table 1—6.4). However,
when assessing the impact of the ATMP regulation on
public expenditures, the EC chose to focus on the extra
costs of implementing and maintaining the legislation
(Table 1—9.11). Almost anecdotally, the IA report
does mention, ‘‘lastly, there may also be a potential
indirect impact on public expenditure through pricing
and reimbursement of advanced therapy products,’’
but—conveniently and rightfully—points out that
‘‘the pricing and reimbursement aspect falls under
the responsibility of Member States’’ (Table 1—9.12).
Pricing and reimbursement issues will soon become
critical as production to GMP and centralized or
national (when HE applies) marketing authorization
requirements will inevitably multiply the price of the
22 (Table 2) ‘‘uncloaked’’ ATMPs. In Belgium, health
care insurance is part of a social security system.
Medical costs are reimbursed by a health insurance
fund and the government fixes reimbursement rates.
Reimbursement rates of ‘‘conventional’’ HCT/Ps are
published in a ministerial decree (FAMHP 2009) that
also fixes the price of lyophilization and WHO-
approved prion- and virus-inactivation techniques.
This price system was installed to cover the real
procurement and processing costs and to leave no
room for unreasonable profits. In 2011, the Belgian
stock market listed bio-medical company that pro-
duces the first and only EC authorized ATMP was
granted national reimbursement for their product
(ChondroCelect for the treatment of symptomatic
knee cartilage lesions; TiGenix 2011). Not surpris-
ingly, the reimbursement price is nearly ten times the
price of non-ATMP autologous chondrocyte cultures
and—due to these high costs—reimbursement is
restricted to patients younger than 50 years. The
reimbursement of ChondroCelect to only a part of
the needy Belgian patients is in conflict with the equal
access to health care, which is one of the leitmotivs of
the Belgian public healthcare system. It indicates that
the increased costs of pharmaceutical production and
marketing requirements are indirectly hampering the
access to cellular therapies. Who will then have access
to future cell therapies, ‘‘self-paying downstream
players’’ to use EC wording, or the ‘‘happy few’’ to
use everyday wording? Ideally, every needy patient
should have access to HCT/Ps, but in the light of the
(unnecessary) high cost of ATMPs and an ever more
rising public health spending and the current economic
crisis, allocation criteria will need to be established.
Should young people with complex fractures have
access to autologous chondrocytes or elderly persons
with arthritis? Anyway, is restricted allocation a viable
option for SMEs already targeting a niche market? For
industry the logical way ahead would be to lobby for
harmonized reimbursement of all ATMPs (for their
authorized clinical indications) that make it to the EU
market (Table 1—10.12). This would fit well in the
Lisbon Strategy, which works towards the achieve-
ment of equity and solidarity through optimized social
protection systems. Some EU initiatives are already
touching on the pricing and reimbursement of medical
devices, such as the upcoming Cross Border Health-
care Directive, which provides for a basis for cross-
border health technology assessment that will obvi-
ously have an influence on pricing and reimbursement
(Vollebregt 2011). So, even though the EU has no
competence to legislate directly on the subject of
pricing and reimbursement of healthcare, it will find
its ways to exert indirect influence where possible. The
industry stands to gain a lot from harmonized rules and
procedures with respect to pricing and reimbursement.
Because, once an ATMP has obtained marketing
authorization, the pressure on companies and authorities
to provide reimbursement becomes harmfully high, it
has been suggested that industry and reimbursement
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authorities should decide which ATMPs will warrant
future reimbursement (for every needy patient) and this
prior to their development (Pirnay et al. 2012a).
Direct impact
For many years therapies involving tissue engineering
(e.g. cell expansion) have been provided by hospitals.
These established therapies are often lifesaving [e.g.
tumor vaccines (Palucka and Banchereau 2011) and
keratinocytes for severely burnt patients (De Corte
et al. 2012)] and their development was done in good
faith and with good intensions (Apperley 2012) and
was characterised by a gradual emergence of efficacy
(Table 1—10.3). In addition, if they are still autho-
rized today, they can most likely present a proven
track record of quality and safety enhancement under
the EUCTDs. As mentioned before, some public
hospitals and laboratories are bound to abandon the
production of these established therapies. In addition,
some commercial products that were already autho-
rized by national authorization systems might also be
taken away from patients (Table 1—11.2). It is up to
the pharmaceutical industry to fill the imminent gap
caused by the ATMP Regulation they asked for and
warmly welcomed, in the name of patient safety
(Table 1—10.6, 14). But, as it costs an estimated $1.8
billion to bring a new drug to the market (Paul et al.
2010), pharmaceutical companies tend to concentrate
on potential best sellers that can be sold to millions of
people (European Union 2001b). The global cell
therapy product revenue (16 leading commercial
products) for 2011 was estimated to be $0.73 billion
(Buckler 2012). All patients hope lie thus with SMEs,
which have the potential to pursue niche markets and
after all they also welcomed the new ATMP Regula-
tion, including the centralised marketing authorization
procedure approach (Table 1—8.4, 10.10,16). Unfor-
tunately, as mentioned before, only two SMEs
successfully completed the certification procedure,
resulting in two ATMPs on the EU single market.
Today, some ‘‘innovative’’ therapies are thus exclu-
sively provided by the public sector. So, if this sector is
not able (or willing) to implement requirements for
drugs or fail to get (central or national) marketing
authorizations, some valuable established therapies will
be made unavailable in several Member States.
In addition, most of the therapies that are in
development in academia and SME’s have not yet
reached the step of clinical trials, which means
complicated approval under the new Regulation.
Ultimately, patients will suffer or even die, unjustly.
The ATMP Regulation will thus have a direct adverse
impact on MDs ability to treat patients.
Examples
Today in Belgium, ‘‘EUCTD compliant’’ keratinocyte
cultures are applied on severely burnt patients at a
price of €5.92 per cm2 (the Belgian reimbursement
price; FAMHP 2009). If Belgian keratinocyte banks
were led to abandon their keratinocyte graft produc-
tion (due to financial reasons and/or reservations on
principle), Belgian burn wound centers would need to
buy ‘‘ATMP compliant’’ keratinocyte cultures on the
EU market. Alternatives are MySkin, produced by
Altrika Ltd in the UK (authorized under the ‘‘specials’’
scheme, which makes export to Belgium uncertain)
and EpiCel, manufactured in the US by Genzyme (no
EU marketing authorization up till now). Prices vary
from €13 to 20 per cm2. The outsourcing of keratino-
cyte production will lead to a delay and a loss of
flexibility in therapy, mainly due to the forward and
backward cross boarder transports of respectively the
starting material (a skin biopsy) and the resulting graft.
In addition, if the Belgian reimbursement price is not
increased proportionately, the hospitals will need to
reserve this therapy, if anything, for young children.
The application of keratinocytes exclusively on
patients with private health insurances is no option
for most hospitals.
In November 2011, EMA’s CAT classified bone
marrow mononuclear cells, intended for the treatment
of ischemic syndromes, as ATMPs instead of as
cellular transplantation. Cuende et al. warned that this
will have a very negative impact on EU public health
services and on patients who will have to wait longer
and pay more for their treatments (Cuende et al. 2012).
Already in 2007, Trommelmans et al. suggested
that the development and application of hTEPs might
influence European healthcare in two respects: the
conditions for the application and reimbursement of
hTEPs, and the allocation of hTEPs to individuals
(Trommelmans et al. 2007a).
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Academia paralyzed
Academia and public institutions did not defend in
full their interests and those of the most important
stakeholders, the patients. It is often suggested that
this is mainly because they are not sufficiently
resourced, experienced and organized to influence
policy. But, we feel that the public sector should also
search in its own conscience. In contrast to industry,
academia and public institutions were unable to
provide sufficient data on the scope and extent of
their tissue (engineering) activities, which has cer-
tainly played a role in the underrepresentation of this
sector in targeted consultations. The in-house sci-
ence service of the EC (DG JRC-IPTS) should at
least have observed this bias. The underrepresenta-
tion of academia and the public sector in public
consultations can be assigned to inexperience,
unawareness and a lack of time. Because they can’t
(afford to) rely on dedicated regulatory affairs
officers, MDs with a full-time job have to defend
their interests and these of academia and public
institutions. It must also be said that some renowned
academic experts simply didn’t bother to participate
in the policy shaping process. They underestimated
the scope and the impact of EU legislation and
thought they would be able to negotiate a solution to
eventual adverse impacts, ad hoc and at a national
level—as they were accustomed to do. But, even
now that the negative impact of the overzealous
requirements on the public HCT/P sector and
patients are materializing, academia—which has
power to influence policy—hardly reacts. This may
be a consequence of the discord that exists within
academia and the deepening ties between academia
and industry. Over the last few decades, universities
have shifted towards the ‘entrepreneurial university’
model (Etzkowitz 2003) that refers to the increasing
tendency to run the university as a quasi-business
with an emphasis on contract research, a very active
patent and licensing policy and the establishment of
spin-offs in the fields of innovative drug design,
materials development, translational medicine and
medical technology and devices. Some university
professors are even member of boards of directors of
spin off companies that develop innovative HCT/Ps.
They were mostly unaware of the fact that business
oriented HCT/P regulation would also apply to their
university spin offs.
Industry’s nature
It is not surprising nor chocking that industry lobbied
for business oriented legislation. According to the
market economy paradigm, the social responsibility of
business is to increase its profits, not to relax the
conditions of profit-maximization on behalf of the
wider interests of society (Friedman 1970). Company
executives have to take into account the interests of
their employees, shareholders and the long-term
interests of the company. As a consequence, compa-
nies do not always see service to the general public as a
key priority. Since long, public cell and tissue banks
and laboratories that manufacture hTEPs are per-
ceived by industry as unjust competitors, and compa-
nies are known to eliminate competitors (e.g. by
forcing them into bankruptcy or preventing new firms
from entering the industry). But, as in the fable about a
scorpion asking a frog to carry him across a river,
industry might well have compromised its own stakes.
In a crucial phase in the development of regenerative
medicine (midway across the river) industry (the
scorpion) lobbied for industry standards to be imposed
on the public sector (stung the frog), dooming both of
them. When asked why, the scorpion pointed out that
this is its nature.
The social responsibility of policymakers
Political authorities, much more than private compa-
nies, have a social responsibility to promote public
health in the most efficient way they can. Unfortu-
nately, policymakers are sometimes unaware of how
changes to policy are taking effect or who is behind
them, an issue, which may be particularly pertinent in
the EU, which is a complex political system with
multiple points of access and into which business
interests are historically highly integrated (Smith et al.
2010a). Who undertakes IAs, on whose behalf, who
provides the required resources including the data, who
decides which stakeholders are involved or excluded,
who influences methodology and who validates results
(Smith et al. 2010a)? Nevertheless, several reports of
studies commissioned by the EC did mention potential
adverse impacts of the HCT/P legislation. The first
IPTS study report mentioned allocation and cost-
effectiveness issues such as the development of tissue-
engineered skin products for the ‘‘self-payer’’ patients
segment (e.g. aesthetic surgery) and a lack of strong
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evidence for superiority and cost-effectiveness of
tissue engineering treatments over the conventional
treatment (Table 1—5.6-7). The ATMP IA predicted
the competition between tissue engineering companies
and hospitals and tissue banks and pricing and
reimbursement issues. Unfortunately, these adverse
impacts were swept under the carpet, as they would
respectively ‘‘remain limited in the short to medium
term’’ and ‘‘fall under the responsibility of Member
States.’’ Policymakers should not be allowed to hide
behind cost-based (economic) options to protect the
interests of private companies. They should assume
their social responsibility. If it can be shown that in
certain cases public tissue banks and laboratories are
the best solution to promote overall health benefits,
compared to eventual commercial alternatives, then
there is a public moral requirement to do so. The need
for regulation of HCT/Ps cannot be denied, but the
regulatory framework must be proportionate, tailored
to the actual players in the field and enabling the
development and timely and horizontal access to
conventional and innovative therapies (Table 1—
8.2). EMA recently admitted that the complexity of
the current legislation prevents providers bringing their
therapies to the market due to a lack of resources to
comply with the regulatory standards and wants to
foster the development of advanced therapy by
strengthening the dialogue with the stakeholders and
the help given to them (EMA/CAT 2010). The clinical
routine in the hospitals performing the cellular thera-
pies must be taken into account by the revision of the
legislation (Klumb 2011). Meanwhile, irreversible
damage is being done as some hospitals and SMEs
are abandoning their efforts due to insurmountable
hurdles or fundamental objections. The ATMP Regu-
lation should thus urgently be revised to focus on
delivering affordable therapies to all who are in need of
them and this without necessarily going to the market.
In particular, we feel that tailor-made and/or niche
ATMPs, provided by public institutions and SMEs
alike—a level playing field is indeed appropriate—
should not face requirements that go beyond the
accreditation system and the quality and safety stan-
dards laid down in the EUCTDs and this for all aspects
of their existence, from donation to distribution. Unless
the EUCTDs are proven to be insufficient to ensure
patient safety (not market access), these non-commer-
cial ATMPs should be kept outside of the scope of the
Medicinal Product Regulation. The EC could, for
instance, publish an interpretative document on ‘‘plac-
ing on the market of ATMPs’’ to achieve this.
Moreover, it seems unlikely that unnecessary stringent
regulation will ultimately benefit the emerging EU
tissue engineering market. To maximize on profit, but
also to flee restrictive US and EU regulation, ‘‘big
pharma’’ and biotech companies increasingly out-
source drug discovery, development and manufactur-
ing to off shore countries like India and China, which
are not characterized by a predominance of risk-averse
regulatory environments.
Health care should be disconnected from market
rationality
In the EU, health care systems have traditionally been
patient-driven and based on the principles of human
dignity, equity (of access), quality (highest possible)
and solidarity (of financing). Social health care
systems are under increasing pressure from such
factors as aging populations, expensive innovative
treatments (e.g. ATMPs), rising public expectations
(e.g. the stem cell hype), intensified fiscal pressures
generated by the current global financial and economic
crisis, and cross-border patient flows (Flear 2009). In
addition, the aims of DG Sanco to protect public health
are increasingly subdued to DG Enterprise’s aims to
promote trade. In this context it is not surprising that
the recent EU HCT/P regulatory framework will
deliberately create a global market for uniform HCT/
Ps in which public cell and tissue banks supply human
cells and tissues to corporate firms. In a two-tier
approach the EU first set the bar just high enough (the
EUCTDs) to ensure that large public banks would still
be able and willing to provide high quality cells and
tissues to an anticipated tissue engineering industry. In
a second phase (the ATMP Regulation) the EU
ensured that the role of these public banks would be
exactly limited to that. They would not (unjustly)
compete with tissue engineering companies. There are
striking parallels with the food sector. The rising
liberalization of agro-industrial markets was also
steered by technological advances and the introduc-
tion of a EU regulatory framework. Small food
producers, unable or not willing to go along with
technological advances and new ideologies in mar-
keting, are suffering under the new product safety
regulations. Established tasty local products are grad-
ually replaced by uniform insipid global brands, with a
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perception of high quality and safety. Mark Flear
(2009) analyzed the discourse of the relaunched
Lisbon Strategy and the techniques of the OMC on
health care and observed a growing linkage of equity
and solidarity with optimization in the context of
‘‘modernization,’’ which serves to place health care
within a neoliberal frame. Neoliberalism seeks to
organize policies in both market and non-market
spheres by extending and disseminating market ratio-
nality and economic behavior (competition, privati-
zation, profit maximization, globalization and
contracts) into nonmarket spheres including health
care, which are thereby subordinated. For example, in
the newly framed HCT/P transplantation field altruis-
tic cell and tissue donations are subjected to market
forces and standards. But, how did the EU manage to
bypass subsidiarity of Member States regarding health
care systems? As explained before, the Amsterdam
Treaty allowed the EU to implement industry quality
and safety requirements to protect the EU citizen’s
health and safety. But, Member States’ health care
systems were still off limits for the EU. With the
Lisbon Strategy and in particular the OMC the EU
could go one step further. Europe’s supranational
community’s main focus has always been on eco-
nomic progress and industrial innovation. Basically,
neoliberalism aimed at accumulating wealth in a few
hands with the argument that it would promote
investment, thereby creating more jobs and more
prosperity for all. The choice for neoliberalism was
thus logical; who does not want economic growth and
jobs? But, the current global financial crisis has
revealed that instead of creating jobs, speculative
investments predominantly fed an ephemeral prosper-
ity that could be wiped out in a short time period
(Beder 2009). Experts increasingly caution that the
liberalization of the EU market might leave behind the
EU’s weakest economies. As is the case for the
overarching EU market, the newly formed commercial
health care market might also leave behind its weakest
links, less well-off patients.
The model neoliberal citizen is one who strategizes
for her- or himself among various social, political and
economic options, nor one who strives with others to
alter or organize these options. According to Le Grand
(2003) it does seem as though there is a convincing
case for the user to have a measure of power over
public service provision. Liberal egalitarians support
redistribution required for universal health care and
think of individual fates as tied together, and of benefits
of social cooperation as to be shared out among
participants (Risse 2005). Reflection is required on
what is more important, communal or individual
welfare, the consumer citizen or the patient-citizen?
With the establishment, in 1951, of the European Coal
and Steel Community, the EU started off as a purely
economic structure and, in essence, it still is today. We
feel, however, that health care should be disconnected
from the cynicism of free market economy.
Conclusions
In the name of safety
In the late nineties, at the peak of the hTEP hype,
industry incited EU policymakers to create a European
regulatory environment that would facilitate the
emergence of a strong internal market for hTEPs.
Officially, industry representatives and policymakers
emphasized that EU HCT/P legislation was urgently
needed to provide protection for public health. The
reason for this is that the EU is exclusively competent
for economic aspects such as the internal market,
monetary policy and biological resources, but there
can be no question of harmonization for certain social
matters such as public health. In other words, public
services such as health care do not subordinate to the
internal EU market. For ‘‘common safety concerns in
public health,’’ however, both the EU and Member
States are authorized, but Member States can only act
if the EU does not act or decides not to act. This means
that if the EC would want to regulate matters that
touch public health, such as the HCT/P transplantation
field, the only gateway would be ‘‘common safety
concerns in public health’’ in an area in which
application of existing Community legislation and
additional national measures have proven insufficient.
The mediatized safety and ethical scandals involving
human cell and tissue transplants, which questioned
the oversight of the HCT/P transplantation field in the
late nineties, presented the EC with an ideal opportu-
nity to issue HCT/P legislation.
Industry’s influence
Naturally, different stakeholders had different inter-
ests, resources, values and aims in the HCT/P field.
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The considerable influence of industry on all levels of
the EU policymaking process (studies, consultations
and IA process) was however decisive. Efficient
industry lobbying lead to asymmetry (towards indus-
try) in studies (e.g. the 2003 IPTS study wrongfully
concluded that hospitals did not yet produce any
hTEPs), consultations and IA, and ultimately to the
provision of distorted information to the EU institu-
tions about the possible economic, social or environ-
mental impact of draft legislative proposals. Industry’s
point of view predominated because debates are made
following their rules, their tools and language and
practices (lobbying), which are not the academic’s
ones.
In summary, industry successfully lobbied to:
• Create the new entity of tissue establishment as
more wide-ranging than conventional notions of
cell and tissue banks. As such, in most Member
States, the procurement of human cells and tissues
falls within the purview of industry.
• Include ATMPs, a subset of HCT/Ps, within the
medicinal products regulatory framework. As a
consequence they must comply with requirements
for pharmaceutical drugs (e.g. GMP compliant
production and marketing authorization).
• Obtain a level playing field. The creation of a HE
backdoor could not be prevented, but industry
managed to keep it so tight that hospitals are not
likely to squeeze in.
• Prevent the distinction between autologous and
allogeneic HCT/P applications.
• Exclude contentious social and ethical issues, such
as the commercialization of human bodily mate-
rial, from the HCT/P legislation.
• Blur the distinctions between non-profit and profit-
making activities of tissue establishments. The
profit that can be made from the processing of
human cells and tissues is not limited.
Impact on the HCT/P transplantation field
The main motive for EU HCT/P legislation was to
facilitate the growth of an emerging human tissue
engineering industry. It is thus not surprising that
instead of dealing with controversial market-driven
practices that plague the HCT/P transplantation field,
it actually creates a favorable environment for legal
excessive profit making activities (LEPRAs) by
facilitating the development of a single HCT/P
market with for-profit tissue establishments and
without limiting the profit that can be made on the
processing of human cells and tissues. Pharmaceuti-
cal industry standards were introduced and ethical
issues were left to be dealt with by the Member
States, insofar possible. This resulted in a risk-averse
and patched EU regulatory environment from which
nobody—patients, public and private tissue estab-
lishments alike—stands to benefit. Industry’s access
to primary material is not guaranteed and the HE rule
produces disorder and uncertainty amongst NCAs
and tissue establishments. The HCT/P legislation was
requested and welcomed by the pharmaceutical and
biotechnology industry, but now it turns out that ‘‘big
pharma’’ is not really interested and that SMEs are
struggling to get their products through the medicinal
product accreditation funnel. Public cell and tissue
banks, the actual suppliers of ‘‘advanced therapies’’
are up against a wall of industry requirements. The
only players that will actually gain from the new
HCT/P regulatory environment are those supplying
GMP equipment and consumables, those offering
custom development and (GMP) biopharmaceutical
manufacturing services (Table 1—6.3) and pharma-
ceutical companies in search of priceless research
tissues. The EU HCT/P legislation, which was
developed under the pretext of improving public
health safety, will not only indirectly (pricing and
reimbursement), but also directly (the imminent loss
of meaningful therapies) impact Member States’
social health systems. The ATMP IA concluded that
the proposed regulatory options would only have an
indirect impact on Member States’ health care
systems. A direct impact would have meant a breach
of the subsidiarity principle and the ATMP Regula-
tion would probably not have been adopted in its
actual form. Because medicine won’t stop on its way,
the field might evolve to develop easier, but less safe
alternatives to the HCT/Ps that are currently pro-
duced by public cell and tissue banks under the
EUCTDs, but will become unreachable under the
ATMPs Regulation. For example, cells and tissues
can be processed peri-operatively and applied in a
single surgical procedure, thus evading compliance
to the ATMP Regulation as well as the EUCTDs.
The most concerned stakeholder, the EU patient,
which the EC somewhat lost out of sight, will
ultimately be the victim.
Cell Tissue Bank (2013) 14:525–560 555
123
Towards a workable solution
EU policymakers should urgently assume their social
responsibilities and safeguard the horizontal and
timely access to affordable, safe, efficient, and ethi-
cally sound advanced therapies. For this they could:
• Put forward a clear ethical position that overcomes
commercialization issues. For instance, the com-
mercialization of human bodily material could be
tolerated when tissue establishments act in good
faith and produce HCT/Ps for use in meaningful
therapies. The good faith of tissue establishments
could be reflected in a HCT/P cost price that only
relates to the added technological process, and this
in a reasonable manner.
• Keep tailor-made and niche ATMPs outside of the
scope of the Medicinal Product Regulation (unless
the EUCTDs are proven to be insufficient to ensure
patient safety). To achieve this in a timely manner,
the EC could publish an interpretative document
on ‘‘placing on the market of ATMPs.’’
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